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I.  Introduction 
Since the United States initiated its military response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, law and respect for legal rights has remained a focal point of legitimacy. 
No single issue, however, has dominated the legal debate. Instead, like Republican candidates 
for the presidential nomination, different issues have risen to discourse dominance, only to 
recede as other issues displace them. Was the invasion of Afghanistan justified? What was 
the status of captured Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives? What techniques were permissible to 
interrogate these detainees? Did the detainees have a right to judicial review? Was the 
invasion of Iraq justified? Was the response to detainee abuses in Iraq sufficient? What was 
the scope of the armed conflict with al-Qaeda, and who was included within the scope of that 
conflict? What were the limits on the use of remotely piloted drones to attack alleged terrorist 
operatives? Could that attack authority extend to U.S. citizens? 
All of these issues have involved the complex intersection of national security policy and 
domestic and international law, and many of them continue to vex policy makers. However, 
almost like the constancy of Mitt Romney, the one issue that has maintained consistent 
prominence throughout this period is the legality of long-term preventive detention of alleged 
enemy belligerents. Indeed, the detention facility established at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was 
from inception and remains to this day a lightening rod of legal controversy. 
The most recent manifestation of this controversy came in the form of the long-term 
detention provisions of the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA 2012). While 
much ink has been spilt on the fundamental question of preventive detention of U.S. citizens 
brought to the surface by these provisions, the procedural mandates included within the 
provisions received less attention. Leaving aside the basic question of substantive detention 
authority, the provision for a right to legal representation for individuals subjected to 
detention is perhaps the most profound shift in detention policy since September 11, 2001. 
Since the inception of the U.S. preventive detention program, there has been an ongoing 
effort to enhance the detention review process. Some of these enhancements have been 
motivated by the Supreme Court’s detainee jurisprudence; others most likely from the 
recognition that it is ultimately counterproductive to detain individuals who may have been 
captured in a broad net but who in fact pose no significant threat to the United States or 
coalition partners. Regardless of the motivation, it is simply beyond dispute that the process 
utilized today to review the detainability of captured personnel is far more protective than 
that originally adopted by the United States (which, to be fair, is in part the result of the bare 
minimalist approach originally implemented by the Bush Administration). 
One procedural protection has, however, been consistently absent from this progression: 
provision of legal representation for the detainee review process. Ostensibly based on an 
analogy to the tribunal provided to individuals contesting their designation as prisoners of 
war (the so-called “Article 5 Tribunal”), detainees are instead provided with a lay military 
officer to serve as their personal representative; in contrast, since the Secretary of Defense 
first ordered the creation of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal in 2004 to review the 
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status of Guantanamo detainees, the government has always been represented by military 
attorneys, or JAG officers.1 
This lay-representation paradigm has finally been called into question. The extremely 
controversial provisions of the NDAA 2012 authorizing preventive military detention of U.S. 
and alien terrorist operatives includes, for the first time, a mandate to provide detainees with 
legal representation during detention review proceedings. The Act, signed into law by 
President Obama on December 31, 2011, provides that the Secretary of Defense must submit 
to Congress within ninety days of enactment a report “setting forth the procedures for 
determining the status of persons detained pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force for purposes of section 1021.”2 The law then provides, inter alia, that an “unprivileged 
enemy belligerent may, at the election of the belligerent, be represented by military counsel 
at proceedings for the determination of status of the belligerent.”3 
It is not yet clear at what point in the detention process this military counsel requirement 
will become operative. According to the Conference Report on this provision of the NDAA 
2012: 
 The Senate amendment contained a provision (sec. 1036) that would require the 
Secretary of Defense to establish procedures for determining the status of persons 
captured in the course of hostilities authorized by the Authorization for Use of Military 
Force (Public Law 107-40), including access to a military judge and a military lawyer 
for an enemy belligerent who will be held in long-term detention. 
 The House bill contained no similar provision. 
 The House recedes with an amendment clarifying that the Secretary of Defense is 
not required to apply the procedures for long-term detention in the case of a person for 
whom habeas corpus review is available in federal court. 
 Because this provision is prospective, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to 
determine the extent, if any, to which such procedures will be applied to detainees for 
whom status determinations have already been made prior to the date of the enactment 
of this Act. 
 The conferees expect that the procedures issued by the Secretary of Defense will 
define what constitutes ‘‘long-term’’ detention for the purposes of subsection (b). The 
conferees understand that under current Department of Defense practice in 
Afghanistan, a detainee goes before a Detention Review Board for a status 
                                                                                                                               
 1. See Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Secretaries of the Military Dep’ts, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Sec’y of Def. for Policy, on the Revised Implementation of 
Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. Naval Base 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba encl. 1, ¶ C(2) (July 14, 2006) [hereinafter CSRT Procedures], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf. 
 2. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 1024(a), 125 Stat. 
1298, 1565 (2011) (citations omitted). Section 1021 of the NDAA 2012 “affirms that the authority of 
the President to use all necessary and appropriate force pursuant to the Authorization for Use of 
Military Force includes the authority . . . to detain covered persons . . . pending disposition under the 
law of war.” Id. § 1021(a) (citations omitted). Persons who may be detained under section 1021 
include persons “who planned, authorized, committed, or aided . . . or harbored those responsible” 
for the attacks occurring on September 11, 2001, as well as “person[s] who [were] a part of or 
substantially supported al-Qaeda, the Taliban, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has committed a 
belligerent act or has directly supported such hostilities in aid of such enemy forces.” Id. § 1021(b). 
 3. Id. § 1024(b)(2). 
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determination 60 days after capture, and again 6 months after that. The Department of 
Defense has considered extending the period of time before a second review is required. 
The conferees expect that the procedures required by subsection (b) would not be 
triggered by the first review, but could be triggered by the second review, in the 
discretion of the Secretary.4 
Thus, legal representation will now turn on the definition of “long-term.” Nonetheless, this 
is an important step forward in the procedural protections afforded individuals subjected to 
wartime preventive detention; and, in the opinion of the authors, long overdue. Whatever the 
ultimate triggering point definition that emerges, the detention review process will 
undoubtedly be enhanced by this provision. While no amount of process will ameliorate the 
concerns of critics of the fundamental concept of applying wartime preventive detention to 
counter-terror operations, even the most ardent of such critics must acknowledge that 
providing representatives trained in the lawyer ethos of zealous representation is a marked 
improvement to the lay representation model utilized prior to the enactment of the NDAA 
2012. 
This provision, and the fact that it has taken a decade to impose such a representation 
requirement, calls into question the legitimacy of subjecting non-traditional captives to 
preventive detention without legal representation. Can a detention review system that relies 
on lay military officers to represent the interests of alleged belligerent operatives ever be 
considered legitimate? While it is clear that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court is inapposite to these non-criminal detention 
proceedings, it is the thesis of this Article that the underlying rationale of that jurisprudence 
indicates that the answer to this question is no, and that the imposition of a legal 
representation requirement is long overdue. 
The Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence has focused primarily on U.S. 
criminal justice (although as noted the Court has also recently addressed the significance of 
legal representation in the context of non-punitive detentions). However, since September 11, 
the preventive detention of alleged terrorist operatives and other unprivileged enemy 
belligerents in the context of what President Bush labeled the Global War on Terror has 
become the most significant focal point in the debate over the balance between government 
interests and individual liberty. Almost immediately after the United States unleashed its 
military power to detect and disable the terrorist threat, an entirely new preventive detention 
regime emerged: the detention of alleged unprivileged belligerents captured in the ongoing 
armed conflict with al-Qaeda and other associated forces. This detention regime has 
generated perhaps more controversy than any other aspect of the ongoing struggle against 
the transnational terrorist threat, triggering an abundance of legal scholarship, commentary, 
and debate. It has also involved ongoing internal government efforts to refine the process for 
assessing which captives should be subjected to what is essentially indefinite detention. 
These efforts have been punctuated by judicial challenges and several critical Supreme Court 
decisions, as well as legislative efforts to provide greater clarity in the balance between 
government detention authority and individual interests. The net result has been both an 
                                                                                                                               
 4. H.R. REP. NO. 112-329, at 696–97 (2011) (Conf. Rep.). 
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endorsement of the government’s invocation of armed conflict-based preventive detention 
authority and imposition of limitations on the President’s authority to manage the detention 
process. 
All of this has resulted in two undeniable realities: first, the assertion of authority based 
on the law of armed conflict to preventively detain captured terrorist belligerents is now 
firmly entrenched and unlikely to be reconsidered any time soon; second, the ever-growing 
recognition that this invocation will result in what Justice Kennedy characterized as 
generational detention5 has and will continue to produce pressure on the United States to 
ensure the accuracy and legitimacy of detention decisions. To this end, the government has 
made substantial advances in the process for assessing when a captured individual should be 
committed to indefinite military detention. These advances have impacted not only the 
several hundred detainees in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but also the thousands of detainees 
held by the United States in Afghanistan. 
These efforts to revise and improve the preventive detention process have produced 
significant modifications intended to protect captives from erroneous detention decisions. 
However, the lack of legal representation for detainees subject to the detention review process 
has remained unaltered since the initiation of the Global War on Terror. The United States’ 
refusal to provide captives assistance of counsel when proceedings may result in indefinite 
detention can rely on a variety of justifications, including, inter alia, the fact that not even 
lawful enemy combatants are afforded assistance of counsel to challenge their preventive 
detention under the Geneva Conventions and that because the nature of the detention is not 
punitive and in no way implicates the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or any 
analogous right necessitating the assistance of defense counsel. Instead, in an obvious 
analogy to the process for determining prisoner of war (POW) status pursuant to the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the Army Regulation 
implementing that treaty, a non-legal representative is provided to assist the captive in 
contesting the legitimacy of the unlawful belligerent status determination and the preventive 
detention resulting from that characterization. 
This Article will question whether denying these captives legal representation is justified 
in light of the interests at stake in the detention review process. In so doing, it will consider 
the fundamental balance between the risks and consequences of error and the feasibility of 
providing such assistance implicated by the preventive detention process, and how this 
balance influences the ongoing conclusion that lay representation by a military officer is 
justified by the nature of the preventive detention process. While acknowledging that 
wartime preventive detentions fall outside the scope of precedents like Powell6 and Gideon,7 
the Article will draw from underlying principles reflected in these decisions to question 
whether the lay representation by military officers is sufficient to effectively advance the 
interests implicated in this non-punitive preventive detention process. Finally, the Article will 
                                                                                                                               
 5. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (identifying the risk that “detention . . . may last 
a generation or more”). 
 6. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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address probable objections to providing legal representation to detainees, including the 
feasibility of doing so. 
The Article will begin, in Part II, with a discussion of the ethos of zealous representation 
and its significance in the U.S. legal culture. Part III of this Article will discuss the extension 
of traditional armed conflict based preventive detention to terrorist operatives following the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. Part III will then trace the evolution of detention procedures 
and the most recent efforts to improve the detention review process in Afghanistan. Part IV 
will discuss the theoretical foundation for the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Part V will 
critically analyze the existing personal representative concept, and suggest why this concept 
is insufficient to render meaningful the procedural protections established to minimize the 
risk of erroneous detention decisions. Part VI will consider the feasibility of providing legal 
representation to individuals subject to indefinite detention as the result of being classified as 
unprivileged belligerents, and consider the inevitable objections to such a concept. Part VI 
will also consider how such representation may potentially impact subsequent judicial review 
required pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene v. Bush, as well as how it 
might contribute to limiting any extension of that decision to other detention environments. 
The Article will conclude by suggesting that the balance of interests involved in the provision 
of legal representation should lead to a careful reassessment of the logic of clinging to the 
current detention review representation paradigm. 
II.  The Lawyer Ethos and Zealous Representation 
In 1932, the Supreme Court decided Powell v. Alabama, a case that arose out of one of the 
most disgraceful incidents in the sordid history of the Jim Crow-era segregation in the 
southern United States.8 Nine African-American men had been summarily tried in a 
Scottsboro, Alabama courtroom for the alleged rape of two Caucasian women: Ruby Bates 
and Victoria Price. Unsurprisingly, all were convicted based only on the testimony of the two 
alleged victims—testimony that would be seriously discredited in subsequent proceedings. 
Defendant Powell was sentenced to death. The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the 
conviction and sentence, although one justice dissented as he recognized that the result was a 
total failure to afford the defendants due process of law.9 
                                                                                                                               
 8. 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
 9. Powell v. State, 141 So. 201, 214–15 (Ala. 1932) (Anderson, C.J., dissenting), rev’d, 287 U.S. 45 
(1932). In his dissent, Chief Justice Anderson of the Alabama Supreme Court stated that the 
ultimate guilt or innocence of the defendants was immaterial if they were not afforded the process 
they were due at trial, and that the trial court should have ordered a new trial once public outrage 
had died down to ensure that the defendants had received a fair trial: 
Under the statute, the defendants being unable to employ counsel, it was the duty of the 
trial judge to appoint counsel . . . . The court did not name or designate particular counsel, 
but appointed the entire Scottsboro bar, thus extending and enlarging the responsibility, 
and, in a sense, enabling each one to rely upon others. . . .  
. . . [While] we can appreciate the position of a lawyer appointed to defend an indigent 
defendant whom he may feel is guilty and as against whom public sentiment is at fever 
heat, the record indicates that the appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and active 
and which is indicated by a declination on the part of counsel to argue the case, 
notwithstanding the solicitor insisted upon the right to open and close, and the state did, in 
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Powell had 
been denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Powell attacked the Alabama trial process on three grounds: he argued 
first, that the summary nature of the process resulted in a denial of due process; second, that 
the exclusion of members of his race from the jury violated due process; and third, that 
Alabama’s failure to provide meaningful assistance of counsel violated due process.10 
In an opinion read today by virtually every law student at the outset of the study of federal 
criminal procedure, the Supreme Court struck down Powell’s conviction.11 The Justices 
coalesced around a clear and compelling premise: the trial without meaningful assistance of 
counsel fatally infected the proceedings and resulted in a violation of Powell’s constitutional 
right to due process. This one flaw in the trial process was of such magnitude that it rendered 
moot Powell’s alternate attacks, which the Court did not even address. The implication was 
clear: even if Powell was correct that the summary process and exclusion of African-
Americans from the jury violated due process, denial of zealous representation of counsel 
produced a pervasive infection to the entire process of such a magnitude that any other error 
would have been superfluous. Nor had the general “assistance of the bar” come even close to 
                                                                                                                               
fact, have the benefit of two arguments and the defendants none. We, of course, realize that 
a defendant can sometimes gain an advantage by agreeing to submit a case without 
argument, as the state has the opening and closing, but, where there is no agreement and 
the solicitor or prosecutor makes two arguments and the counsel for defendant makes none, 
it is bound to make an unfavorable impression on the jury. 
. . . . 
As to whether or not these defendants are guilty is not a question of first importance, the 
real one being, Did they get a fair and impartial trial as contemplated by the bill of 
rights? . . . 
. . . . 
It may be that neither of the foregoing reasons [namely lack of zealous representation and 
consideration of the case by a biased jury], if standing alone should reverse these cases, but, 
when considered in connection with each other, they must collectively impress the judicial 
mind with the conclusion that these defendants did not get that fair and impartial trial that 
is required and contemplated by our Constitution. Therefore, in justice to the defendants 
and to the fair name of the state of Alabama, as well as the county of Jackson, these cases 
should be retried after some months of cooling time have elapsed and by their vigilant 
employed counsel. 
 Id. (citation omitted). Chief Justice Anderson went on to cite Alabama’s own precedent demanding 
fair trial in criticism of the trial court’s actions, noting how the nature of a particular crime obviates 
neither the defendants’ rights nor the trial courts’ mandate to ensure those rights are properly 
protected: 
. . . “[T]he law should prevail, without any reference to the magnitude or brutality of the 
offense charged. No matter how revolting the accusation, how clear the proof, or how 
degraded, or even brutal, the offender, the Constitution, the law, the very genius of Anglo-
American liberty, demand a fair and impartial trial. If guilty, let him suffer such penalty as 
an impartial jury, unawed by outside pressure, may under the law inflict upon him. He is a 
human being and is entitled to this. Let not an outraged public, or one which deems itself 
outraged, stain its own hands—stamp on its soul the sin of a great crime—on the false plea 
that it is but the avenger of the innocent.” 
 Id. at 215 (quoting Seay v. State, 93 So. 403, 405 (Ala. 1922)). 
 10. Powell, 287 U.S. at 50. 
 11. Id. at 65. 
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protecting Powell’s rights.12 Thus, the Supreme Court emphasized a simple yet compelling 
premise: that a lawyer for the defense, devoted to the cause of the client and committed to 
zealously represent that cause, is the true sine qua non of ensuring fundamental fairness and 
a just outcome in the criminal adjudicatory process. Powell, however, was limited to capital 
cases, a holding confirmed two decades later in Betts v. Brady.13 
Three decades later the Court would once again address the relationship between zealous 
legal representation and fair process. In Gideon v. Wainwright, Petitioner Clarence Gideon 
challenged his conviction and incarceration resulting from a trial at which his request for an 
appointed defense counsel had been denied based on Florida law.14 Gideon had, of course, 
been afforded the right to secure his own attorney, but when he informed the court that he 
was indigent and could not afford counsel, he was told that he would have to defend himself 
against the District Attorney.15 However, Gideon was not facing capital punishment, and, as 
a result, Powell’s holding did not require Florida to appoint counsel for Gideon (at the time, 
Florida and several other states did not provide indigent defendants with counsel in non-
                                                                                                                               
 12. Id. at 56. The Supreme Court noted that while the trial court called for the local bar to assist the 
defendants, any such assistance rendered fell short of the defendants’ constitutional right to legal 
representation: 
. . . [U]ntil the very morning of the trial no lawyer had been named or definitely designated 
to represent the defendants. Prior to that time, the trial judge had “appointed all the 
members of the bar” for the limited “purpose of arraigning the defendants.” Whether they 
would represent the defendants thereafter if no counsel appeared in their behalf, was a 
matter of speculation only, or, as the judge indicated, of mere anticipation on the part of the 
court. Such a designation, even if made for all purposes, would, in our opinion, have fallen 
far short of meeting, in any proper sense, a requirement for the appointment of counsel. 
How many lawyers were members of the bar does not appear; but, in the very nature of 
things, whether many or few, they would not, thus collectively named, have been given that 
clear appreciation of responsibility or impressed with that individual sense of duty which 
should and naturally would accompany the appointment of a selected member of the bar, 
specifically named and assigned. 
 Id. 
 13. 316 U.S. 455, 464 (1942) (considering “whether due process of law demands that in every criminal 
case, whatever the circumstances, a State must furnish counsel to an indigent defendant” and 
whether “the furnishing of counsel in all cases [is] dictated by natural, inherent, and fundamental 
principles of fairness”), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court held that 
the Sixth Amendment possesses no “inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any 
court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel.” 
Id. at 473. The Supreme Court thus declined to fully incorporate the Sixth Amendment against the 
States, preferring to allow each State to legislate which situations guarantee a right to appointed 
counsel and which do not. 
 14. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 337. 
 15. The following exchange occurred at the trial court and was memorialized in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion: 
“The COURT: Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I cannot appoint Counsel to represent you in this 
case. Under the laws of the State of Florida, the only time the Court can appoint Counsel to 
represent a Defendant is when that person is charged with a capital offense. I am sorry, but 
I will have to deny your request to appoint Counsel to defend you in this case. 
“The DEFENDANT: The United States Supreme Court says I am entitled to be represented by 
Counsel.” 
 Id. 
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capital criminal trials). The Supreme Court received Gideon’s petition in forma pauperis, and 
the Court appointed Abe Fortas to advocate Gideon’s cause.16 
The issue presented to the Court was more significant than the right to be represented by 
counsel; the issue was whether the failure of the government to provide such representation 
to indigent defendants fatally undermined the legitimacy of the criminal adjudicatory process 
and thereby violated Gideon’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. During his 
argument before the Court, Fortas noted: 
Without [counsel], how can a civilized nation pretend that it is having a fair trial under 
our adversary system, which means that counsel for the State will do his best within 
the limits of fairness and honor and decency to present the case for the State and 
counsel for the defense will do his best similarly to present the best case possible for the 
defendant and from that clash there will emerge the truth. That is our concept. And 
how can we say? How can it be suggested that a court is properly constituted, that a 
trial is fair, unless those conditions exist.17 
Gideon prevailed on his challenge, and the Court’s decision extended Powell’s logic to any 
criminal defendant.18 Once again, the message was clear: the zealous legal representation for 
an accused is essential to ensuring the fundamental fairness of criminal process. 
                                                                                                                               
 16. Abe Krash, Architects of Gideon: Remembering Abe Fortas and Hugo Black, THE CHAMPION (Mar. 
1998), http://www.nacdl.org/Champion/Articles/98mar02.htm. 
 17. Transcript of Oral Argument, Part I, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (No. 155), available at 
http://www.oyez.org/cases/1960-1969/1962/1962 155. 
 18. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45; Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40, 47 (1972) (holding that 
counsel must be appointed in any case resulting in a sentence of actual imprisonment absent the 
defendant’s knowing and intelligent waiver). The Court declined to create different rules for felonies, 
misdemeanors, and petty offenses, noting that the “requirement of counsel may well be necessary 
for a fair trial even in a petty-offense prosecution,” and reasoning that: 
. . . legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads to imprisonment 
even for a brief period are [not] any less complex than when a person can be sent off for six 
months or more. 
. . . . 
We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty 
offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial. . . .  
. . . . 
Under the rule we announce today, every judge will know when the trial of a 
misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be imposed, even though local law permits 
it, unless the accused is represented by counsel. He will have a measure of the seriousness 
and gravity of the offense and therefore know when to name a lawyer to represent the 
accused before the trial starts. 
 Id. at 33–40 (citations omitted). But see Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979) (holding that counsel 
does not need to be appointed if the defendant was convicted but not sentenced to any term of 
imprisonment). The Court, noting a distinction between imprisonment as an authorized and 
threatened possible penalty and imprisonment actually assessed as a penalty, concluded that 
. . . the central premise of Argersinger—that actual imprisonment is a penalty different in 
kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment—is eminently sound and warrants 
adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional right to appointment 
of counsel. . . . We therefore hold that the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United 
States Constitution require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed 
counsel in his defense. 
 Id. at 373–74. 
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In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court held that the Gideon right to counsel, 
provided at government expense, is triggered by any sentence that includes even one day of 
incarceration.19 Rejecting a misdemeanor-felony dichotomy and drawing a trigger point at the 
sentences to incarceration, and not at the nature of the offense, the Court indicated its 
recognition that it is the consequence of government action, and not necessarily the label, that 
implicates this fundamental right.20 In another line of decisions, the Court also held that 
even when a defendant is represented at trial, failure of counsel to provide effective 
representation results in constitutional error.21 It has therefore become axiomatic that 
zealous representation of counsel is an essential component to the criminal adjudication 
process. Nor has the importance of counsel been limited to the criminal incarceration context. 
In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court upheld the preventive detention authority 
established by Congress in the Bail Reform Act of 1984,22 relying in large measure on the 
Act’s provision for an adversarial hearing in which the suspect is entitled to be represented by 
counsel.23 
III. Terrorism, Armed Conflict, and Preventive Detention 
A. Detention of Combatants and the Global War on Terror 
Since the inception of what President Bush called the “Global War on Terror,” it has 
become apparent that the United States considers the preventive detention of captured 
enemy belligerents a fundamental incident of armed conflict authorized by customary 
international law.24 This is a clear departure from the law of peace.25 While U.S. 
                                                                                                                               
 19. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 40. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984) (the fact that “a person who happens to be a 
lawyer is present at trial alongside the accused . . . is not enough to satisfy the constitutional 
command”). The Court held that the Sixth Amendment “envisions counsel’s playing a role that is 
critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results. An accused is entitled to be 
assisted by an attorney, whether retained or appointed, who plays the role necessary to ensure that 
the trial is fair.” Id. Strickland also set down the requirements for a successful ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim. See generally id. at 689–96 (discussing the elements for holding that counsel 
provided ineffective assistance and thereby effectively denied the defendant his constitutional right 
to counsel). 
 22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (2006) (allowing a judicial officer, after a hearing, to order the detention of 
the accused before trial if “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community”). 
Section 3142(f) provides the circumstances under which a hearing must be held and lists the rights 
of the accused at that hearing, which include “the right to be represented by counsel, and, if 
financially unable to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed.” Id. § 3142(f). 
 23. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (holding that “the provisions for pretrial 
detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fall within th[e] carefully limited exception [of detention 
prior to trial or without trial]” because the Act’s detention authority requires an adversary hearing 
showing that the accused poses “a threat to the safety of individuals or to the community which no 
condition of release can dispel” and that the Act requires “numerous procedural safeguards” at the 
adversarial hearing before the accused can be detained). 
 24. See, e.g., Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 62 (D.D.C. 2009), abrogated by Uthman v. Obama, 
637 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (holding that the AUMF authorized the President to detain members 
of the “enemy ‘organizations’ ” named in the AUMF). 
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jurisprudence has established several very limited situations in which preventive detention is 
lawful outside the context of armed conflict,26 due process normally requires prompt charge 
and trial to justify a deprivation of liberty outside the armed conflict context.27 In the armed 
conflict context, however, preventive detention is an action justified by the principle of 
military necessity, a customary international law norm that permits belligerents to take all 
measures not otherwise prohibited by international law necessary to bring about the prompt 
submission of an opponent.28 
Depriving captured enemy belligerents of the opportunity to return to hostilities is 
certainly necessary to defeat an enemy.29 Nonetheless, there is contemporary debate related 
to whether preventative detention authority is the same in both international and non-
international armed conflicts. Several treaties, including most importantly, the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (GPW) (which regulates the 
treatment of certain categories of detained combatants and civilians acting on behalf of 
enemy States in an international armed conflict), are clearly founded upon an international 
consensus that States have the legal authority to detain such individuals. However, neither 
customary nor treaty law involving the law of armed conflict (LOAC) provide clear authority 
related to the detention of enemy belligerents in the context of non-international armed 
conflicts. As a result, some experts assert that domestic statutory authority is required to 
legally justify preventive detention in this context, even while conceding such detention is 
consistent with the principle of military necessity.30 Pursuant to this legal interpretation, 
                                                                                                                               
 25. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, art. 118, Aug. 12, 1949, 
6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GPW] (“Prisoners of war shall be released and 
repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”). 
 26. See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51 (holding that the individual’s strong interest in and right to 
liberty “may, in circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently weighty, be 
subordinated to the greater needs of society,” but also expressing that the extensive safeguards for 
the accused built in to the Bail Reform Act and the hearing requirement prior to detention were 
sufficient to defend the Act against a facial challenge to constitutionality). 
 27. Id. at 755 (holding that post-indictment, pretrial preventive detention under the Bail Reform Act 
does not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment or the Excessive Bail Clause of the 
Eighth Amendment); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (“[A] citizen-detainee seeking to 
challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his 
classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral 
decisionmaker.”). 
 28. See DEP’T OF ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10: THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE 3–4 (1956) [hereinafter FM 
27-10]. 
 29. See, e.g., al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 216 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom. by al-Marri v. 
Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (holding that while Congress may have given the President the 
authority to detain petitioner as an enemy combatant, petitioner had been given insufficient process 
to challenge his detention). 
 30. See Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 71 (D.D.C. 2009). Petitioners’ argument rejected the 
government’s status-based detention scheme as well as its authority to preventatively detain in a 
non-international armed conflict (NIAC): 
Petitioners . . . insist[] that detention based solely on membership in an organization such as 
al Qaeda is completely antithetical to the law of war. Such an approach is prohibited by the 
law of war, the argument goes, because it represents detention based on status rather than 
conduct, which is impermissible in the context of the current non-international armed 
conflict. Petitioners also contend that status-based detentions ignore the distinction between 
combatants and civilians in traditional international armed conflicts. In their view, that 
distinction—which is fundamental to the law of war—leads to the conclusion that the only 
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preventive detention of a non-state belligerent absent such domestic statutory authority is 
inherently arbitrary.31 
                                                                                                                               
persons who are detainable in the current armed conflict are “individuals who were lawful 
combatants under Article 4 of the Geneva Conventions (members of an armed force of a 
State or other militia as described in Article 4), and civilians who become unlawful 
combatants by reason of their direct participation in hostilities as that standard is 
understood in international law.” As a practical matter, then, the only individuals who 
would be detainable under petitioners’ framework are civilians who directly participate in 
hostilities (i.e., individuals who would be detainable based upon their conduct, not their 
status), because by definition no “lawful combatants” fight on behalf of the enemy in the 
current non-international armed conflict. 
 Id. at 70–71 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). While the D.C. Circuit rejected several of these 
claims (citing the Geneva Conventions), it did state that the line beyond which the government 
could not detain legally under either international law or the AUMF was demarcated by the 
difference between membership in associated forces and providing “substantial support” to those 
forces: 
In addition to members of al Qaeda and the Taliban, the government’s detention authority 
also reaches those who were members of “associated forces.” For purposes of these habeas 
proceedings, the Court interprets the term “associated forces” to mean “co-belligerents” as 
that term is understood under the law of war. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [However,] [d]etaining an individual who “substantially supports” such an organization, 
but is not part of it, is simply not authorized by the AUMF itself or by the law of war. Hence, 
the government’s reliance on “substantial support” as a basis for detention independent of 
membership in the Taliban, al Qaeda or an associated force is rejected. 
 Id. at 74–76. 
 31. See generally Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and 
Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1084–87 (2008) (discussing the Geneva 
Convention criteria applicable to finding that a detainee deserves POW treatment, and asserting 
that while the “laws of war also provide for military detention or preventive internment during non-
international armed conflicts (NIACs),” there are no explicit detention criteria for NIACs (as 
opposed to those for IACs), and the only bright-line rule applicable to NIAC detainees appears in 
Common Article 3, and in certain articles of the First and Second Additional Protocols to the Geneva 
Conventions) (footnote omitted). However, because the United States is not a party to the Additional 
Protocols, any authority thereby would be customary international law or non-binding on the United 
States. See also Jody M. Prescott, Detention Status Review Process in Transnational Armed Conflict: 
Al Maqaleh v. Gates and the Parwan Detention Facility, 5 U. MASS. ROUNDTABLE SYMP. L.J. 34,  
54–55 (2010). Prescott describes the U.S. policy decision to apply a domestic military regulation, AR 
190-8 to all detainees regardless of the type of conflict they were captured in, and considers the 
concern that even this step, which grants protections to so-called unlawful enemy combatants, still 
falls short of the humanitarian baseline encouraged by some critics of U.S. detention policy: 
For detainees held in non-international armed conflicts, Common Article 3 of the 1949 
Geneva Conventions sets the baseline for physical treatment but does not specify how 
detainee status should be determined or reviewed. As a matter of implementing U.S. policy, 
the decision to apply AR 190-8 to all detainees regardless of the nature of the conflict 
provides for an expansion in the humanitarian treatment afforded by Common Article 3. 
Practically, this is consistent with the aim of the theory of transnational armed conflict, but 
some might argue that this expands the scope of armed conflict beyond what international 
humanitarian treaty law, and possibly customary law, allows. Accordingly, some might 
argue that the process afforded under AR 190-8, although greater than that expected under 
international law in cases of international armed conflict, is not sufficient from an 
international human rights law perspective for the detention of individuals who are believed 
to be a part of al Qaeda. 
 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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The United States follows a different interpretation of the law, relying on the customary 
LOAC principle of military necessity to justify the detention of enemy belligerents in any 
armed conflict, even absent a treaty or statute expressly authorizing preventive detention.32 
This legal basis for the entire unprivileged belligerent detention regime is based on a seminal 
World War II era Supreme Court precedent—the principal authority relied on by the 
Supreme Court when it endorsed President Bush’s invocation of preventive detention 
authority to incapacitate captured al-Qaeda and Taliban personnel.33 
B. The U.S. Legal Foundation for Preventive Detention of Enemy 
Belligerents 
The 1942 Supreme Court decision Ex parte Quirin reviewed the legality of the trial by 
secret military commission of nine German saboteurs.34 The defendants had been arrested by 
the FBI after landing on Long Island and Florida, and dispersing to cities in the United 
States.35 Selected by the German intelligence service because of their proficiency in English 
and U.S. dialects, the defendants were all members of the German armed forces trained to 
conduct sabotage missions.36 After coming ashore from a German U-Boat, they immediately 
discarded their uniforms and proceeded to various locations within the United States, 
ostensibly to execute their sabotage missions.37 
All of the saboteurs were quickly apprehended by the FBI. Although the Department of 
Justice began the process to bring them to trial in federal court, President Roosevelt chose 
instead to order trial by a secret military commission on war crimes.38 The commission was 
convened by order of the President, and the saboteurs were all charged with violations of the 
laws and customs of war, including espionage and operating as unlawful belligerents.39 
The German defendants challenged the legality of trial by military commission by writ of 
habeas corpus to the Supreme Court.40 In a per curiam opinion, the Court denied the writ 
                                                                                                                               
 32. Francis Lieber defined military necessity as “those measures which are indispensible for securing 
the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.” U.S. WAR 
DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD, 
General Orders No. 100 art. 14 (prepared by Francis Lieber) (1863). More recently, the United 
States has defined military necessity as “that principle which justifies those measures not forbidden 
by international law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the enemy as 
soon as possible.” FM 27-10, supra note 28, ¶ 3(a). 
 33. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 34. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 35. Id. at 21. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. Roosevelt ordered trial by military commission because he “feared that [the saboteurs] would 
not be punished severely enough in an Article III court.” Carlissa Carson, Yes We Can Revise the 
Current Military Commission System, but Why?, 25 CONN. J. INT’L L. 389, 399 (2010). 
 39. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 22–23. 
 40. See id. at 18–19. The German defendants argued that 
. . . the President is without any statutory or constitutional authority to order the petitioners 
to be tried by military tribunal for offenses with which they are charged; that in consequence 
they are entitled to be tried in the civil courts with the safeguards, including trial by jury, 
which the Fifth and Sixth Amendments guarantee to all persons charged in such courts 
with criminal offenses. In any case it is urged that the President’s Order, in prescribing the 
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and held that the military commission had lawful jurisdiction to try the saboteurs. The Court 
held that, as enemy belligerents, the defendants were subject to the law of war.41 More 
importantly, the invocation of this law was justified by the state of war between Germany 
and the United States, providing the source of authority for the capture, detention, and trial 
of the defendants.42 
Although the Quirin decision focused primarily on the legality of trial by military 
commission, it also addressed preventive detention authority. According to the Court: 
 By universal agreement and practice the law of war draws a distinction between the 
armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those 
who are lawful and unlawful combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and 
detention as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are 
likewise subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlawful.43  
The Supreme Court therefore did not consider statutory detention authority necessary to 
justify the preventive detention of captured enemy belligerents, and instead relied on the 
customary law of war. Perhaps even more important for the events that transpired after 
September 11, 2001, the Court clearly considered this authority applicable to captured enemy 
belligerents irrespective of whether they qualified as “lawful” combatants (captured enemy 
belligerent personnel qualified for status as prisoners of war pursuant to the Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War).44 
Soon after initiation of American military action against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in 
Afghanistan following the terror attacks of September 11, the U.S. military began detaining 
Taliban and al-Qaeda operatives. Many captives were subsequently transferred to the newly 
established Military Detention Facility at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. Military 
Order No. 1, issued by President Bush in November 2001, included a directive to establish 
this facility for the detention of “unlawful alien enemy combatants.”45 Accordingly, U.S. 
nationals were excluded from the category of captured personnel subject to detention at 
Guantanamo; however, they were not excluded from the broader scope of unlawful combatant 
                                                                                                                               
procedure of the Commission and the method for review of its findings and sentence, and the 
proceedings of the Commission under the Order, conflict with Articles of War adopted by 
Congress . . . and are illegal and void. 
 Id. at 24. 
 41. Id. at 15. 
 42. See id. at 12. The Court discussed unlawful belligerents, such as saboteurs, and discussed their 
rights under the law of armed conflict in the following manner: 
The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent in time 
of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the enemy, or an 
enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of 
waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar examples of belligerents who are 
generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of prisoners of war, but to be offenders 
against the law of war subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals. 
 Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See infra pp. 135–40. 
 45. Military Order of November 13, 2001—Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in 
the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 § 3(a) (2001) [hereinafter Military Order No. 1]. 
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detention. The United States soon discovered that one captive who had been transferred from 
Afghanistan to Guantanamo, Yaser Esam Hamdi, had been born in the United States and 
was therefore a U.S. citizen. This knowledge did not result in his release or transfer to 
civilian custody for purposes of trial by federal court. Instead, his preventive detention 
continued, but only after he was immediately transferred to a military confinement facility 
within the United States. 
Hamdi’s father successfully petitioned the courts by writ of habeas corpus filed as a “next 
friend” on behalf of his son. The challenge culminated with the Supreme Court decision of 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.46 Invoking Quirin, the Supreme Court endorsed Hamdi’s continued 
preventive detention as an enemy belligerent.47 Although the Court also held that Hamdi was 
entitled to more meaningful procedural protections than had been afforded by the executive 
branch, it rejected the assertion that Hamdi’s detention was unlawful because he had not 
been captured in the context of a formally declared war against a state enemy. Instead, 
because Hamdi had been captured in the context of an armed conflict prosecuted by the 
President with the statutory support of Congress (in the form of the 2001 Authorization for 
Use of Military Force (AUMF) against those responsible for the terror attacks of September 
11, 2001),48 and had been engaged in hostilities against U.S. and Coalition forces, Hamdi was 
legally indistinguishable from the defendants in Quirin.49 According to the Court: 
 In light of these principles, it is of no moment that the AUMF does not use specific 
language of detention. Because detention to prevent a combatant’s return to the 
battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of “necessary 
and appropriate force,” Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in 
the narrow circumstances considered here.50 
Earlier in the opinion, the Court emphasized that the “principles” and customs it 
referenced in the extract quoted above were the principles derived from the law of war 
permitting the preventive detention of captured enemy personnel.51 According to the Court, 
Congress implicitly invoked these principles when it authorized the President to use all 
“necessary and appropriate” force against “nations, organizations, or persons associated with 
                                                                                                                               
 46. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 47. Id. at 519 (“There is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy 
combatant . . . [c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, 
and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy 
belligerents within the meaning of . . . the law of war”) (quoting Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37–38). 
 48. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The AUMF was a 
congressional mandate stating, 
. . . the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those 
nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or 
persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons. 
 Id. § 2(a). 
 49. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–17 (“The threshold question before us is whether the Executive has the 
authority to detain citizens who qualify as ‘enemy combatants’ . . . [we find that regardless of 
whether the President could order detention without Congressional authority, in this situation] 
Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF.”). 
 50. Id. at 519. 
 51. Id. 
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the September 11th terrorist attacks.”52 In short, the AUMF authorized the President to 
invoke the same principle of military necessity that had been central to the Quirin Court’s 
endorsement of preventive detention of the German saboteurs in 1942. 
The Hamdi opinion laid a legal foundation that continues to be built upon today. By 
extending the Quirin holding to armed conflict against individuals, organizations, and 
nations associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11, the Court endorsed the 
application of the armed conflict legal framework to the struggle against transnational 
terrorism.53 However, by condemning the summary process relied upon by the executive 
branch to determine that Hamdi fell into the category of detainable enemy belligerent, the 
Court also set in motion a procedural revision process that continues to this day.54 Thus, the 
preventive detention of terrorists pursuant to the law of armed conflict involves two distinct 
legal questions. First, from a substantive perspective, who falls within the scope of this 
preventive detention authority? Second, to what process are individuals alleged to fall within 
that scope entitled? 
1. The Substantive Foundation 
As significant as Hamdi’s extension of the Quirin precedent was to the “war on terror,”55 
the Court addressed only what it characterized as the narrow question of whether a U.S. 
citizen falling into an accepted core definition of enemy combatant could be preventively 
detained.56 
Concluding that Hamdi’s detention did not violate substantive due process was 
accordingly unremarkable. Instead, it was based on the narrow underlying conclusion that 
preventive detention of an enemy combatant in an armed conflict is legally authorized, even 
if, as in the case of Hamdi, the combatant is a U.S. citizen.57 (This conclusion perforce means 
                                                                                                                               
 52. See id. at 518. 
 53. See GEOFFREY S. CORN ET AL., THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE LAWS OF WAR: A MILITARY 
PERSPECTIVE (2009). 
 54. See, e.g., BENJAMIN WITTES ET AL., THE EMERGING LAW OF DETENTION: THE GUANTÁNAMO HABEAS 
CASES AS LAWMAKING 76 (2010), available at 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0122_guantanamo_wittes_chesney/0122_gu
antanamo_wittes_chesney.pdf (“[W]hile the detainees are asking the Court of Appeals to adopt a 
stricter standard of proof, the government is asking it to force the lower court judges to lighten up”). 
 55. The authors use this term to generally define the operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban 
operatives occurring primarily in Afghanistan, with the recognition that some operations occur in 
other countries or parts of the world. 
 56. The Court acknowledged that the issue before it was 
whether the Executive has the authority to detain citizens who qualify as “enemy 
combatants.” There is some debate as to the proper scope of this term, and the Government 
has never provided any court with the full criteria that it uses in classifying individuals as 
such. It has made clear, however, that, for purposes of this case, the “enemy combatant” that 
it is seeking to detain is an individual who, it alleges, was “part of or supporting forces 
hostile to the United States or coalition partners” in Afghanistan and who “engaged in an 
armed conflict against the United States” there . . . [w]e therefore answer only the narrow 
question before us: whether the detention of citizens falling within that definition is 
authorized. 
 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516. 
 57. See id. at 532–33. 
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that such authority exists with respect to alien enemy combatants, given that aliens enjoy no 
more constitutional protections than U.S. citizens.) This conclusion is based on a law of armed 
conflict axiom: the authority of states to kill enemy combatants implies the authority of states 
to detain them to prevent their return to hostilities58: 
We conclude that detention of individuals falling into the limited category we are 
considering, for the duration of the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so 
fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the “necessary and 
appropriate force” Congress has authorized the President to use.59 
The Hamdi opinion therefore explicitly validated the legality of preventive detention of 
enemy combatants; however, it did not provide a comprehensive definition of the term “enemy 
combatant.” Instead, the Court expressly left the definitional process to the lower courts: “The 
legal category of enemy combatant has not been elaborated upon in great detail. The 
permissible bounds of the category will be defined by the lower courts as subsequent cases are 
presented to them.”60 Subsequent U.S. practice, judicial decisions, and congressional action in 
this field have exposed how laced with ambiguity this term is in the context of counter-terror 
operations. 
The Hamdi Court apparently expected greater clarity would result from decisions related 
to subsequent habeas corpus petitions from Guantanamo detainees. However, Congress 
quickly responded to Hamdi (and the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul v. Bush that the 
                                                                                                                               
 58. The Court previously ruled on a similar issue: whether a state governor could order his National 
Guard contingent to detain state citizens participating in an insurrection or preventing the National 
Guard from restoring the peace. See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909). In Moyer, the respondent 
deployed the Colorado National Guard to quash what he considered to be an “insurrection” pursuant 
to his powers under the Constitution of Colorado. Petitioner, alleged to be a leader or active 
participant of the insurrection, was detained for two and a half months but suit was never filed 
against him. In ruling in favor of the respondent (and in favor of the detention), the Supreme Court 
stated: 
The [Colorado] Constitution is supplemented by an act providing that ‘when an invasion of 
or insurrection in the state is made or threatened, the governor shall order the national 
guard to repel or suppress the same’ . . . That means that he shall make the ordinary use of 
the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons who resist, and, of course, that he may use 
the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of 
restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of 
precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile power. So long as such arrests are made in good 
faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the 
governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office, on 
the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief . . . When it comes to a decision 
by the head of the state upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals 
must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the 
substitution of executive process for judicial process. 
 Id. at 84–85. Although the case involves a state’s power to deal with intrastate security issues, there 
are obvious parallels to the more recent federal jurisprudence regarding detainment. 
 59. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518. Additionally the Court noted the “clearly established principle of the law of 
war that detention may last no longer than active hostilities.” Id. at 520 (citing GPW, supra note 25, 
art. 118 (“Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of 
active hostilities.”)). As pointed out in Hamdi and other cases involving detaining belligerents 
during the ongoing Global War on Terror, it is currently impossible to determine what event(s) 
would demarcate the end of active hostilities for a war fought across the globe against transnational, 
non-state actors. 
 60. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 522 n.1. 
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federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, applied to detainees in Guantanamo)61 by 
restricting the access of Guantanamo detainees to habeas corpus review. These restrictions 
were set forth in the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), which, inter alia, amended the habeas 
statute to effectively reverse the decision in Rasul and instead provided for an alternative 
form of review by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals.62 Then, in response to the Supreme 
Court’s determination in its 2006 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision, which held that the DTA did 
not apply retroactively (this permitting statutory habeas challenges to go forward so long as 
they were pending at the time Congress passed the DTA),63 Congress enacted the Military 
Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006,64 which, inter alia, amended the statute so that it was clear 
that the restrictions imposed on statutory habeas access by the DTA applied both 
prospectively and retrospectively. 
The foregoing series of judicial decisions and countermanding statutory amendments set 
the stage for Boumediene v. Bush.65 Boumediene involved the questions of (1) whether non-
resident aliens detained outside the territory of the United States at the Guantanamo 
detention facility were entitled to the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus; and, if so, (2) 
whether the DTA as amended by the MCA provided an adequate substitute for that 
privilege.66 Justice Kennedy wrote for the five-justice majority which held that the unique 
                                                                                                                               
 61. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The Supreme Court, in considering whether detainees at 
Guantanamo could seek relief under the federal habeas statute, noted the historical applications of 
the writ of habeas corpus and determined that if the issuing court had jurisdiction to issue the writ, 
then it had the power to do so: 
Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at [Guantanamo] is consistent with 
the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. At common law, courts exercised habeas 
jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within sovereign territory of the realm, as well 
as the claims of persons detained in the so-called “exempt jurisdictions,” where ordinary 
writs did not run, and all other dominions under the sovereign’s control . . . . 
In the end, the answer to the question presented is clear. Petitioners contend that they 
are being held in federal custody in violation of the laws of the United States. No party 
questions the District Court’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians. Section 2241, by its 
terms, requires nothing more. We therefore hold that § 2241 confers on the District Court 
jurisdiction to hear petitioners’ habeas corpus challenges to the legality of their detention at 
the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base. 
 Id. at 481–83 (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted). 
 62. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2680 (2005); Pub. L. No. 109-
163, tit. XIV, 119 Stat. 3136 (2006) [hereinafter DTA]. 
 63. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). The Government’s first challenge to the federal courts 
exerting habeas jurisdiction over Guantanamo detainees was based on an argument that the DTA 
applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of the statute’s enactment. See id. at 574–75. The 
Court analyzed other provisions of the DTA and found language which applied the DTA to pending 
cases; however this language was absent from the jurisdiction-stripping provisions. Id. at 578–79. 
The Court rejected the retroactively-applied jurisdiction-stripping argument, holding that “a 
negative inference may be drawn from the exclusion of language from one statutory provision that is 
included in other provisions of the same statute” and determining that “Congress’ rejection of the 
very language that would have achieved the result the Government urges here weighs heavily 
against the Government’s interpretation.” Id. at 577–80. 
 64. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 3, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) [hereinafter 
MCA]. 
 65. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 66. Id. at 732–33. See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
The Constitution does not actually grant any right to habeas corpus; the Suspension Clause merely 
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situation of these detainees—detained by the federal government in an area outside the 
territorial sovereignty of the United States but subject to the exclusive control of the United 
States,67 with no viable alternative access to challenge the legality of their detention; facing a 
genuine prospect of generational deprivation of liberty;68 and far removed from the battlefield 
point of capture—required extension of constitutional habeas access to allow them to 
challenge their detention.69 Furthermore, the Court concluded that review in the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, authorized by the DTA and MCA, was an inadequate 
substitute for habeas review by a court, as required by the U.S. Constitution.70 
As a result of this decision, the process anticipated by Justice O’Connor in her Hamdi 
opinion, by which lower courts would add the proverbial “flesh to the bones” of the term 
“enemy combatant” finally began in earnest. Since the Boumediene decision, the federal 
courts in the District of Columbia Circuit have entertained numerous habeas petitions filed 
by Guantanamo detainees challenging the legality of their continued detention. Many of 
these challenges have required the courts to engage in the process of determining, first, how 
to define “enemy combatant” and second, which petitioners have been properly designated by 
the government as enemy combatants subject to lawful preventive detention.71 
                                                                                                                               
states the situations under which Congress may suspend the writ. Thus, in American law, the right 
to constitutional habeas relief both predates the Constitution of the United States and should be 
assumed to be available unless Congress has enacted legislation under the Suspension Clause to 
strip away rights to access the writ. Constitutional habeas rights should not be confused with 
statutory habeas rights. The United States Code provides the procedure for applications of statutory 
habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241–54. 
 67. Contra Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69 (discussing how Johnson v. Eisentrager declined to extend 
full constitutional protections to territories temporarily controlled by the United States (such as the 
territories temporarily occupied and administered by the United States following the German 
surrender in 1945) but asserting that “Guantanamo Bay . . . is no transient possession. In every 
practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant jurisdiction of the United 
States”) (citing Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 480 (2004) (“By the express terms of its agreements 
with Cuba, the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay 
Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control permanently if it so chooses.”) (citation 
omitted)). In his Rasul concurrence, Justice Kennedy also emphasizes this point: 
Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory, and it is one far 
removed from any hostilities. . . . In a formal sense, the United States leases the Bay; the 
1903 lease agreement states that Cuba retains “ultimate sovereignty” over it. At the same 
time, this lease is no ordinary lease. Its term is indefinite and at the discretion of the United 
States. What matters is the unchallenged and indefinite control that the United States has 
long exercised over Guantanamo Bay. From a practical perspective, the indefinite lease of 
Guantanamo Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United States, extending the 
“implied protection” of the United States to it. 
 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 
339 U.S. 763, 777–78 (1950)). 
 68. See, e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 729 (discussing a concern in the CSRT process and identifying 
that “the consequence of error [in a CSRT tribunal] may be detention for the duration of hostilities 
that may last a generation or more”). 
 69. See id. at 770–71, 797 (noting that “[s]ome of these petitioners have been in custody for six years 
with no definitive judicial determination as to the legality of their detention” and, as a result, 
determining that “[t]heir access to the writ is a necessity to determine the lawfulness of their status, 
even if, in the end, they do not obtain the relief they seek”). 
 70. See id. at 791–92. 
 71. Between 2004 and 2009, a total of 581 CSRTs were held; of those, 539 detainees were determined to 
be properly classified as enemy combatants, 39 were found to no longer be classified as enemy 
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The contours of the definition that is gradually emerging from this litigation process are 
sketchy at best. As a result, it is useful to conceptualize the LOAC preventive detention 
authority for terrorist operatives through the following analytical model. 
First, as the courts have recognized that the AUMF is the basis for the authority to 
preventively detain in the present conflict, the courts have focused their analysis on defining 
the groups that fall within the scope of the AUMF, i.e., the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and associated 
forces.72 
Second, in order to apply AUMF detention authority, the courts have adopted a working 
definition of an “unlawful enemy belligerent” (the term adopted by President Obama as a 
substitute for the original “unlawful enemy combatant” used by President Bush),73 as more 
fully discussed below. 
Third, in applying the authority and definition in individual cases, the reviewing courts 
have sought to determine (1) whether the government, by a preponderance of the evidence, 
has alleged conduct by the detainee that is sufficient to bring the detainee within the 
definition of “unlawful enemy belligerent;” and (2) whether the government has provided 
sufficient evidence to support its allegations.74 An affirmative finding with respect to both 
                                                                                                                               
combatants, and 2 tribunals were held in suspension. DEP’T OF DEF., COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW 
TRIBUNAL SUMMARY (Feb. 10, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/csrtsummary.pdf. 
The Administrative Review Board records made public show that a total of approximately 707 ARBs 
had been held between 2006 and February 2008, and approximately 95 detainees were designated 
to be transferred. See generally DEP’T OF DEF., ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD SUMMARY: ARB-2 
(Apr. 25, 2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/arb2.pdf (reporting that out of 330 
detainees eligible for an ARB review during the period of April 25, 2006 to February 20, 2007, 330 
ARBs were held, 55 detainees were designated to transfer and 273 detainees were designated to 
continue detainment, with 2 decisions not yet finalized by the Designated Civilian Officer (DCO)); 
DEP’T OF DEF. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD SUMMARY: ARB-3, available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/arb3.pdf (reporting that out of 253 detainees eligible for an ARB 
review during the period of January 30, 2007 to March 2008, 253 ARBs were held, 33 detainees 
were designated to transfer and 195 detainees were designated to continue detainment, with 25 
decisions not yet finalized by the DCO); DEP’T OF DEF., ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW BOARD SUMMARY: 
ARB-4 (Feb. 6, 2009), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/arb4.pdf (reporting that out of 164 
detainees eligible for an ARB review during the period of February 19, 2008 to February 2009, 124 
ARBs were held, 7 detainees were designated to transfer and 92 detainees were designated to 
continue detainment, with 26 decisions not yet finalized by the DCO). As of January 2, 2011, 67 
habeas petitions filed by Guantanamo detainees had been considered by federal district courts in 
the D.C. Circuit. See generally Lyle Denniston, Boumediene: The Record So Far, SCOTUSBLOG 
(Jan. 2, 2011, 11:44 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/01/boumediene/. Of 38 granted writs of 
habeas corpus, the United States did not appeal 29 and did appeal 9; 2 of those appealed by the 
United States were vacated or reversed. See id. Table 1. Of the 29 detainees whose writs were 
granted and not appealed, all but 5 detainees had been transferred to other countries as of January 
2011. Id. For a discussion of the various detainability definitions employed by the D.C. federal 
district courts and D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, see infra note 184. 
 72. Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 70 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that because the AUMF 
authorized the use of “all necessary and appropriate force” against the non-state organizations 
involved in the 9/11 attacks, the AUMF also implicitly authorized the use of such force, including 
detention, against the members of those organizations and non-member supporters, regardless of 
whether they directly participated in hostilities or not). 
 73. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Pub. Affairs, Department of Justice Withdraws “Enemy 
Combatant” Definition for Guantanamo Detainees (Mar. 13, 2009), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2009/March/09-ag-232.html. 
 74. See WITTES, supra note 54, at 13 (citing In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, Misc. No. 08-
442, (D.D.C., Nov. 6, 2008) (case management order citing Boumediene to establish “[t]he 
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inquiries results in the denial of habeas relief and continued preventive detention, at least 
until the executive chooses to release the detainee through the Periodic Review Board 
process,75 which will be discussed in more detail below. A negative finding on either of these 
inquiries results in granting habeas relief and an order to release the detainee (which does 
not result in actual release until the U.S. government has identified a nation willing to take 
the detainee). 
This case-by-case approach to each detainee who wishes to challenge his detention is the 
focus of a process of complicated and time-consuming habeas litigation before the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Columbia. Developing a workable definition of “unlawful 
enemy belligerent” involves a complex synthesis of existing LOAC principles related to 
preventive detention of enemy belligerents and the realities of counter-terror operations. It is 
impossible to ignore the reality that the U.S. government has struggled as a result of the 
absence of express LOAC authorities applicable to combating transnational terrorism. 
Combined with the operational challenges of conducting effective counter-terrorism 
operations, this has made it difficult to develop a logical and clearly legitimate approach to 
preventive detention of transnational terrorist operatives. As a result, the courts have been 
called upon to intervene to clarify the scope of preventive detention authority, and are now 
decisively engaged in rendering decisions that ostensibly will provide clearer guidance on the 
scope of this authority. Whether such clarity will emerge, and, if so, whether it will be 
operationally rational, remain open questions. 
2. Extending the Traditional Legal Basis to Terrorist Detainees 
Continuing uncertainty aside, it is clear that the Hamdi Court’s holding—that detention of 
enemy belligerents was a necessary incident of war—provided an important foundation for 
subjecting terrorists to preventive detention.76 Hamdi, having been captured on the field of 
battle after engaging U.S. and Coalition forces in combat, fell into the core of any definition 
that could be adopted. The United States, however, would extend the detention authority 
endorsed in Hamdi well beyond that core. 
President Bush defined the category of individuals subject to wartime detention in his 
Military Order No. 1 directing the detention of captured terrorists at Guantanamo. That 
Order included the following definition of individuals subject to preventive detention: 
 (a) The term “individual subject to this order” shall mean any individual who is not a 
United States citizen with respect to whom I determine from time to time in writing 
that: 
  (1) there is reason to believe that such individual, at the relevant times, 
   (i) is or was a member of the organization known as al Qaida; 
                                                                                                                               
government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner’s 
detention is lawful”). 
 75. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,227 § 3(a) (Mar. 7, 2011). 
 76. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (“Because detention to prevent a combatant’s 
return to the battlefield is a fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of ‘necessary 
and appropriate force,’ Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow 
circumstances considered here.”). 
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(ii) has engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of 
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefor, that have caused, threaten 
to cause, or have as their aim to cause, injury to or adverse effects on the United 
States, its citizens, national security, foreign policy, or economy; or 
(iii) has knowingly harbored one or more individuals described in 
subparagraphs (i) or (ii) of subsection 2(a)(1) of this order; and 
  (2) it is in the interest of the United States that such individual be subject to this 
order.77 
This definition was broader than the category of enemy belligerent analyzed by the Hamdi 
Court.78 Nonetheless, it provided the initial scope of detention authorization relied on by the 
United States. Of particular significance is that it included within its scope not only actual 
terrorist operatives captured during the planning, preparation, or execution of hostilities, but 
also individuals who provide assistance to such operatives.79 Additionally, a determination of 
membership in al-Qaeda—whatever the basis for that determination—would itself be 
sufficient to trigger preventive detention authority.80 
Although President Bush attempted to prohibit judicial review of the legality of the 
preventive detention regime established in Military Order No. 1, it soon became clear that the 
federal courts were unwilling to acquiesce to his effort. In Rasul v. Bush,81 the Supreme 
Court rejected the President’s attempt to shield the Guantanamo detention operations from 
judicial scrutiny by interpreting the federal habeas corpus statute to run to the Guantanamo 
Naval Base.82 However, on the same day, the Court in Hamdi indicated that judicial review 
of detentions might not be necessary should the executive provide the type of minimal 
procedural protections that the Court indicated were required for U.S. citizen detainees.83 In 
                                                                                                                               
 77. Military Order No. 1, supra note 45, § 2(a). While detention is authorized under Military Order No. 
1, few detainees were actually designated as subject to the Military Order for purpose of detention. 
See JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33180, ENEMY 
COMBATANT DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT 9 n.59 (2010). Rather, 
such detention generally occurs under the authority granted in the AUMF, which courts have 
interpreted to include the right to detain. 
 78. On at least two previous occasions, different branches of the federal government considered what 
persons might be designated enemy combatants (or some synonym thereto). Compare Ex parte 
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942) (“[c]itizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the 
enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, 
are enemy belligerents within the meaning of . . . the law of war”) with Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521 
(2004) (“The United States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, individuals legitimately 
determined to be Taliban combatants who ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States.’ 
If the record establishes that United States troops are still involved in active combat in Afghanistan, 
those . . . are authorized”). 
 79. See Military Order No. 1, supra note 45, § 3(a). 
 80. See id. 
 81. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). The Supreme Court decided both Hamdi and Rasul on June 28, 
2004. 
 82. Id. at 480 (discussing how the terms of the Guantanamo lease state that the United States 
“exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base,” and as the 
petitioners are under the exclusive custody of the United States, a United States district court has 
jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus challenges from the petitioners under the federal habeas statute). 
 83. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 533–34. 
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response to the suggestion, the Department of Defense implemented a new procedure for 
assessing the belligerent status of individuals transported to Guantanamo.84 
The process implemented by the Department of Defense involved two review tribunals for 
all individuals initially designated by the executive branch as subject to Military Order No. 1. 
The first tribunal was designated as a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT). This 
CSRT would make the initial determination of whether an individual transported to 
Guantanamo should continue to be detained preventively as the result of being an unlawful 
enemy combatant (the predecessor term to the currently-used “unprivileged enemy 
belligerent”).85 The procedures adopted for the CSRT were based loosely on the procedures 
provided for in Army Regulation (AR) 190-8,86 which itself provided the procedures for 
conducting a review hearing required by the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention when the 
POW status of a detainee is uncertain; however, the CSRT provided additional procedural 
protections that were not set out in AR 190-8.87 In the context of POW determinations, these 
tribunals are known as Article 5 Tribunals (referring to the article in the Geneva Prisoner of 
War Convention that requires a tribunal to determine POW status when a captive’s status is 
“in doubt”).88 
                                                                                                                               
 84. See generally Dep’t of Def., Memorandum for the Sec’y of the Navy, Order Establishing Combatant 
Status Review Tribunal (July 7, 2004) [hereinafter CSRT Order], available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Jul2004/d20040707review.pdf; CSRT Procedures, supra note 1. See 
also JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31367, TREATMENT OF “BATTLEFIELD 
DETAINEES” IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 52–56, available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/58279.pdf (discussing the historical treatment of 
wartime detainees and summarizing legislative acts and proposals related to detention and the war 
on terror considered by the 108th, 109th, and 110th Congressional sessions). 
 85. See CSRT Order, supra note 84, pmbl. (stating that the CSRT Order applied only to foreign 
nationals held at Gunatanamo). 
 86. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8: ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, 
CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES § 3-15(b) (1997) [hereinafter AR 190-8]. 
 87. See CSRT Order, supra note 84, ¶¶ (g)–(h). 
 88. GPW, supra note 25, art. 5 (“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a 
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of the categories 
enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until 
such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”). The referenced Article 4 
defines prisoners of war as: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or 
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and . . . other volunteer corps . . . provided that such 
[organizations] fulfill the conditions . . . of being commanded by a person responsible for his 
subordinates; . . . having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; . . . carrying 
arms openly; . . . [and] conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or an authority 
not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof . . . 
provided that they have received authorization from the armed forces which they 
accompany . . . . 
(5) Members of crews . . . of the merchant marine and . . . civil aircraft of the Parties to the 
conflict . . . . 
(6) Inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously 
take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form themselves into 
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However, because President Bush determined that the individuals subjected to detention 
at Guantanamo could not qualify as POWs (eliminating any doubt that they might qualify for 
POW status),89 a different characterization was adopted for use in the CSRTs. Instead of 
determining whether they were entitled to POW treatment, a CSRT would determine 
whether detainees were unlawful enemy combatants.90 If an individual was designated as an 
unlawful enemy combatant, detention would be authorized indefinitely subject to an annual 
review to assess the continued detention justification. This annual review would be conducted 
by a second tribunal, which had been established prior to, and possibly in anticipation of, the 
Rasul and Hamdi decisions, known as the Administrative Review Board (ARB).91 
The CSRTs would obviously need a standard to apply to determine who would remain in 
preventive detention and who had been improperly detained and transported to 
Guantanamo. The Secretary of Defense’s order directing the Secretary of the Navy 
(presumably because the Navy operates Guantanamo) to establish the CSRT provided the 
following definition: 
                                                                                                                               
regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of 
war. 
 Id. art. 4. Subsection (B) defines two additional categories of persons who are treated as POWs 
under the Prisoner of War Convention. In his commentary to the Third Convention, Jean S. Pictet 
(who served as an editor for the 1949 Geneva Conventions) describes the intent leading up to the 
adoption of the second paragraph of Article 5: 
At Geneva in 1949, it was first proposed that for the sake of precision the term “responsible 
authority” should be replaced by “military tribunal[.]” This amendment was based on the 
view that decisions which might have the gravest consequences should not be left to a single 
person, who might often be of subordinate rank. The matter should be taken to a court, as 
persons taking part in the fight without the right to do so are liable to be prosecuted for 
murder or attempted murder, and might even be sentenced to capital punishment. This 
suggestion was not unanimously accepted, however, as it was felt that to bring a person 
before a military tribunal might have more serious consequences than a decision to deprive 
him of the benefits afforded by the Convention. A further amendment was therefore made to 
the Stockholm text stipulating that a decision regarding persons whose status was in doubt 
would be taken by a “competent tribunal”, and not specifically a military tribunal. 
 INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION (III) 
RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 77 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952) (internal citations 
omitted). It is clear that from the beginning of the codification of proper treatment for any detained 
enemy combatants, whether lawful combatants entitled to POW status or unlawful combatants not 
entitled thereto, that the military tribunal might not be the proper forum in which the status 
determination should be made. However, it is telling that those who drafted and edited the 1949 
Conventions did not truly imagine a world where combatants would truly be owned by no nation: in 
the first sentence of his commentary on paragraph 2 of Article 5, Pictet writes: “This [paragraph] 
would apply to deserters, and to persons who accompany the armed forces and have lost their 
identity card.” Id. 
 89. Bush Says No POW Status for Detainees, CNN U.S. (Jan. 28, 2002), http://articles.cnn.com/2002-01-
28/us/ret.wh.detainees_1_detainees-camp-x-ray-unlawful-combatants?_s=PM:US. 
 90. See ELSEA & GARCIA, supra note 77, at 7. See generally DEP’T OF DEF., COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW 
TRIBUNALS (Sept. 26, 2006), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Oct2006/d20061017CSRT.pdf. 
 91. See generally Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Secretaries of the Military Dep’ts, 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Under Sec’y of Def. for Policy, on the Revised 
Implementation of Administrative Review Procedures for Enemy Combatants Detained at U.S. 
Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (July 14, 2006) [hereinafter ARB Procedures] available at 
http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/d20060809ARBProceduresMemo.pdf. See also infra notes 
108, 167–68. 
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Enemy Combatant. For purposes of this Order, the term “enemy combatant” shall mean 
an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated 
forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners. 
This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act or has directly supported 
hostilities in aid of enemy armed forces. Each detainee subject to this Order has been 
determined to be an enemy combatant through multiple levels of review by officers of 
the Department of Defense.92 
This definition did seem to establish the requirement for a more direct link between the 
detainee and the conduct of combat operations than that in Military Order No. 1. However, by 
also including within the definition of detainable captives those individuals who provided 
support to al-Qaeda or the Taliban, it produced no significant difference between the 
controlling standard to be applied by the CSRTs and the President’s initial definition. 
Another definition that emerged in response to the initial detainee decisions by the 
Supreme Court was included in the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).93 This law was 
enacted by Congress in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan striking down 
the military commission ordered established by President Bush in Military Order No. 1.94 
Congress enacted the MCA to both cure the procedural defects that had doomed that original 
military commission and to ensure that unlawful enemy combatants detained at 
Guantanamo would in fact be subject to trial by military commission. Accordingly, it was 
necessary for Congress to provide its own definition of who fell within MCA jurisdiction—a 
definition that by implication also indicates who may be preventively detained. According to 
10 U.S.C. § 948a, the persons subject to the MCA include: 
(i) a person who has engaged in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially 
supported hostilities against the United States or its co-belligerents who is not a lawful 
enemy combatant (including a person who is part of the Taliban, al Qaeda, or 
associated forces); or 
(ii) a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy combatant by 
a Combatant Status Review Tribunal or another competent tribunal established under 
the authority of the President or the Secretary of Defense.95 
What is most significant about both the definition adopted by the Department of Defense 
for purposes of the CSRTs, and the definition enacted by Congress in the 2006 MCA, is that 
each indicates that persons who materially support a terrorist group need not actually 
commit belligerent acts in order to be treated as enemy combatants. 
This broad definition would remain the basis for U.S. detentions for as long as the 
detention process remained outside judicial scrutiny. Accordingly, the United States could, 
and often did, subject captured aliens, believed to be part of or to have provided support to 
                                                                                                                               
 92. CSRT Order, supra note 84, ¶ (a). 
 93. MCA, supra note 64. 
 94. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 632 (2006) (holding Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions 
applicable to the armed conflict against al-Qaeda and further holding that the military commissions 
did not constitute “regularly constituted courts” as required by Common Article 3). 
 95. 10 U.S.C. § 948a (2006) (as enacted by the MCA, supra note 64, § 3), amended by Pub. L. 111-84, tit. 
XVIII, 123 Stat. 2190 (2009). To be subject to trial by military commission, a person meeting the 
definition of unlawful enemy combatant also must be an alien (i.e., not a U.S. citizen). Id. 
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al-Qaeda, to detention without charge or trial.96 The CSRTs did provide a limited check on 
this process, but only in relation to the weight of the evidence supporting the characterization 
and not in relation to the definition itself. Nor did the limited judicial review of CSRT 
decisions subsequently authorized in the Detainee Treatment Act provide detainees with a 
viable opportunity to challenge the scope of the enemy combatant definition; it merely 
authorized judicial review of whether the CSRT had followed its own procedures.97 
In June 2008, the efforts of the President and Congress to limit judicial review of 
preventive detention of Guantanamo detainees were nullified by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Boumediene v. Bush.98 In a 5–4 decision, the Court held that (1) the detainees 
enjoyed a constitutional privilege to petition the federal courts for habeas corpus; (2) the 
review procedures in the CSRTs and the Detainee Treatment Act were not an adequate 
substitute for this privilege; and (3) the detainees could challenge their continued detention 
as a violation of both substantive and procedural due process.99 This decision cleared the way 
for detainees to challenge not only the process they had been afforded to authorize their 
preventive detention, but perhaps more importantly the scope of the definition of enemy 
belligerent itself—the definition pursuant to which they were detained. The response by both 
the executive branch and the courts that began to decide these challenges is ongoing at the 
time of this writing, although the trend seems to be toward strengthening the link between 
the LOAC principle of military necessity and the definition that justifies preventive 
detention. By opening the door to federal court review, Boumediene placed Guantanamo 
detainees in what is in actuality an enviable position. 
3. Recent Evolution of the Detention Review Process: The Bagram 
Model 
While many of the Supreme Court opinions related to detainment have issued from suits 
filed by detainees held in Cuba, the Bagram Collection Point (BCP) near Kabul, Afghanistan 
has been the primary detention facility for terrorist operatives captured in Afghanistan since 
May 2002.100 From Bagram, some detainees were transferred to Guantanamo, while others 
remained detained in Afghanistan.101 It was at Bagram that the first detainee review boards 
                                                                                                                               
 96. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Adam Liptak, Detainee Bill Shifts Power to President, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 
2006, at A1 (discussing the powers granted to the President under the post-9/11 enemy combatant 
detention statutes, including the powers “to identify enemies, imprison them indefinitely and 
interrogate them—albeit with a ban on the harshest treatment—beyond the reach of the full court 
reviews traditionally afforded criminal defendants and ordinary prisoners”). 
 97. See ELSEA, supra note 84, at 53–55. 
 98. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 99. See id. at 728–30. 
 100. See Prescott, supra note 31, at 38–43 (describing the history of the American presence at Bagram 
Airfield and the changes made with the Parwan detention facility); Jeff A. Bovarnick, Detainee 
Review Boards in Afghanistan: From Strategic Liability to Legitimacy, ARMY LAW., June 2010, at 9, 
15. See also infra note 167 (discussing the number of detainees at Guantanamo versus the number 
at Bagram, as well as the number of detainees classified as eligible for release or transfer, and 
statistics on the number of military commission trials held since 2001). 
 101. Guantanamo Bay Detainees, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_detainees.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 
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occurred, wherein personnel from several different military offices reviewed detainee files and 
applied the classified criteria that might require the detainee to be transferred to another 
facility, such as Guantanamo.102 From 2002 to the present, the detainee review boards 
conducted at detention facilities have undergone multiple iterations in name, form, and 
procedure. 
The first set of detainability review meetings were conducted by Detention Review Boards 
(DRBs) making assessments from 2002 until 2005. In September 2004, transfers between 
Bagram and Guantanamo ceased, in large part due to the Supreme Court’s rulings in Rasul 
v. Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld three months prior.103 During the initial two years of DRBs 
at Bagram, detainees were still being transferred from Bagram to Guantanamo; thus, “the 
primary determination of the DRB was whether or not a detainee met the (classified) criteria 
to be transferred to GTMO.”104 Additionally, a major determinant of whether a detainee 
                                                                                                                               
2012). The last news release announcing a transfer of detainees to Guantanamo occurred on 
September 12, 2007; the last transfer from Afghanistan to Guantanamo occurred in 2004. Id. 
 102. Bovarnick, supra note 100, at 16 (“The composition of the DRB was approximately ten personnel, 
including MI, MPs, the members of the Criminal Investigative Task Force (CITF), and a judge 
advocate legal advisor”). 
 103. See id. at 18. As Rasul established that federal courts could decide whether noncitizens detained at 
Guantanamo were wrongfully imprisoned and Hamdi held that detainees who are U.S. citizens 
must have the ability to challenge their enemy combatant status before an impartial court, it is 
unsurprising that the Administration would decide to cease transferring detainees to Guantanamo 
and thus effectively give them access to the federal courts. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). The Administration may have believed that keeping 
detainees out of Guantanamo would also prevent them from challenging their detention in court due 
to the suspension of habeas corpus provided in the MCA; in 2010, the D.C. Circuit held that the 
district court lacked jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed by detainees at Bagram. See Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’g 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2010) (holding 
that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ writs of habeas corpus, as 
petitioners were held at Bagram, outside the de jure sovereignty of the United States and thus 
previous statutory invocations of the Article I, Section 9 Suspension Clause served to deny the 
district court jurisdiction over petitioners’ habeas petitions). See also Prescott, supra note 31, at 63–
70 (discussing the district court’s six analytical factors parsed from Boumediene: “detainee 
citizenship, detainee status, nature of the apprehension site, nature of the detention site, adequacy 
of the status determination process and ‘practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s 
entitlement to the writ’ ” and the court’s addition of a seventh factor: “the length of a petitioner’s 
detention without adequate review’ ”) (quoting Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 215–16). As 
Boumediene had set out factors but had not deeply analyzed them, the district court made 
determinations of which factors should carry more—or any—weight. See id.  
 104. Bovarnick, supra note 100, at 16. Bovarnick describes the process of the DRB at the time: 
All available information—whether sparse “evidence packets” from the capturing units or 
packets built by interrogators in the BCP—was brought before the DRB to assess the 
criteria. If the detainee did not appear to meet even the threshold determination of being an 
enemy combatant due to the lack of evidence, as a courtesy (not a requirement), a 
designated DRB member would contact the capturing unit after the pre-meeting to inform 
the commander of the detainee’s likely release recommendation if no further information 
was provided. In general, this revelation would often prompt units to send representatives to 
the DRB to “testify” about the circumstances of capture and provide relevant evidence on the 
detainee’s acts, if any, to make a case for continued detention.  
As a detainee’s case was presented, the members of the DRB would form a consensus 
regarding whether the detainee met the criteria of an enemy combatant. If the consensus 
was that there was not enough evidence, a recommendation for release would be made, and 
the detainee would be placed on a “release list” to be approved by the Commander. . . . If the 
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would be transferred to Guantanamo was the potential of gathering further intelligence from 
the detainee.105 If the DRB determined that the detainee was an enemy combatant but did 
not meet the Guantanamo transfer requirements, Military Intelligence would make a 
determination as to whether the detainee had future intelligence value or presented a 
continued security threat; if so, the detainee would continue to be held. At no point in the 
DRB process was the detainee informed that the DRB was occurring; additionally, only those 
individuals actually detained at the BCP underwent the Detention Review Board process, 
even though the BCP itself housed far fewer detainees than the total number of individuals 
detained in Afghanistan.106 
In 2004, Bagram was re-designated as the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF) 
and in 2005, the DRBs changed to Enemy Combatant Review Boards (ECRBs). The 2005 
policy change would remain in effect until January 2007.107 
In February 2007, the boards’ name changed again, to Unlawful Enemy Combatant 
Review Boards (UECRB). Accompanying the name change were changes to composition (i.e., 
reduction in the number of officers on the Board from five down to three) and procedure 
                                                                                                                               
detainee was determined to be an enemy combatant, the next question was whether the 
detainee met the criteria to be sent to GTMO. 
 Id. (footnote omitted).  
 105. Id. at 17.  
 106. Id. Bovarnick describes the state of affairs for DRBs from 2002–2005 in the following manner: 
Between May 2002 and June 2003, based on the . . . commander’s guidance, the 
maximum number of detainees in the BCP never exceeded one hundred. While the overall 
detainee population, which included the Kandahar detention facility and other temporary 
detention sites, was much larger, only those detainees at the BCP went through the DRB 
process. During this first year, anywhere from ten to fifteen detainee files were reviewed 
each week with each DRB session to review and discuss detainee files with the CJ2 [the lead 
intelligence officer] lasting up to two hours. With the constant flow of detainees in and out of 
the BCP, the number of files reviewed was simply a calculation to process the ninety-day 
reviews. In the summer of 2003, the maximum number of detainees authorized in the BCP 
doubled to two hundred; consequently, the number of files reviewed at each DRB rose 
accordingly. 
 Id. (footnote omitted). 
 107. Id. at 18–19. Bovarnick notes that the process remained very similar to the 2002–2005 DRB review 
but points out one positive change in transferring some detainees to local authorities for 
prosecution: 
Other than the name change and the alteration in board composition [reducing the number 
of military officers sitting on the Boards], the procedures were similar to those dating back 
to 2002; detainees could not appear in person before the boards, nor did they have a personal 
representative (PR). The ECRBs met once per week, but instead of holding pre-meetings like 
the ones that met in the 2002–2005 timeframe, the board members were provided detainee 
packets in advance and then convened to discuss the packets and vote on whether the 
detainee met the criteria for enemy combatant status. The only oral evidence presented at 
the ECRB was still given by the MI personnel who prepared the detainee packets. If the 
capturing unit had an interest, for either detention or release, they could send a 
representative to the board to argue their position. While transfer to GTMO was no longer 
an option, the ECRB could recommend release or continued detention in certain categories 
based on the level of threat. In an important step forward in both the Rule of Law and 
counterinsurgency realms, new options for the ECRBs were explored such as transfer to the 
Afghan authorities for prosecution or repatriation programs. 
 Id. (footnote omitted). 
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which would last until September 2009.108 The first and most important change was a 
standard, implemented in April 2008, of officially providing a detainee with notice of a 
pending UECRB.109 This notice provided a detainee with information as to the “general basis 
of his detention” and allowed the detainee to appear before the board and make a 
statement.110 
In January 2009, President Obama signed three executive orders related to the 
interrogation of detainees and procedures to be followed at detainment centers.111 
Significantly, Order 13,493 included the following definition of who could be detained: 
The President has the authority to detain persons that the President determines 
planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, and persons who harbored those responsible for those attacks.The 
President also has the authority to detain persons who were part of, or substantially 
supported, Taliban or al-Qaida forces or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities 
against the United States or its coalition partners, including any person who has 
committed a belligerent act, or has directly supported hostilities, in aid of such enemy 
armed forces.112 
                                                                                                                               
 108. Additional to the Board’s duties were categorizing the detainees based on relative intelligence value 
and threat level, and also determining the viability of local prosecution: 
[Detainees were divided] into separate categories: High Level Enemy Combatant (HLEC); 
Low Level Enemy Combatants (LLEC); and Threat only. Those who were to be released 
were categorized as No Longer Enemy Combatant (NLEC). As the UECRB worked its way 
through the six hundred detainees in the BTIF, the files of all detainees assessed as LLECs 
were transferred to the DAB [Detainee Assessment Branch, which made recommendations 
of prosecution to the local Afghan legal authorities]. The DAB, comprised of military 
intelligence analysts and military criminal investigators, assessed the detainee files for 
potential transfer to Afghan authorities for prosecution. To support the Rule of Law mission, 
the DAB would only recommend transfer of cases for prosecution if there was solid evidence. 
Those detainees not recommended for transfer remained interned until their next review in 
six months. 
 Id. at 19–20 (footnotes omitted). 
 109. Id. at 19. However, even in 2008, there were discrepancies between detainee rights at Bagram and 
the rights of those detained at Guantanamo: 
[D]eficiencies included “no recourse to a neutral decisionmaker” on status determinations; 
no access to even a personal representative before the hearing board for the petitioners; only 
an opportunity to submit a written statement to the board rather than to speak; no right for 
the petitioners to see the evidence which inculpated them; and uncertain evidentiary 
standards. 
 Prescott, supra note 31, at 67 (quoting Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 226–27 (D.D.C. 
2010)). 
 110. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, FIXING BAGRAM: STRENGTHENING DETENTION REFORMS TO ALIGN WITH U.S. 
STRATEGIC PRIORITIES 16 n.23 (2009) (citing Declaration of Colonel Charles A. Tennison (Sept. 15, 
2008)). 
 111. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (2009) (Ensuring Lawful Interrogations); Exec. Order 
No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (2009) (Review and Disposition of Individuals Detained at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities); Exec. Order No. 13,493, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 4901 (2009) (Review of Detention Policy Options). 
 112. Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to Detainees 
Held at Guantanamo Bay at 2, In re Guantanamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 577 F. Supp. 2d 312 
(2008) (Misc. No. 08-0442), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memo-re-det-auth.pdf. 
See also Exec. Order No. 13,493 § 1(a). 
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Order 13,493 thus establishes the legal framework for a unit to detain an individual on the 
battlefield: “If this threshold determination is not met on the battlefield, then a unit has no 
authority to detain.”113 At the same time the President issued this Executive Order, the 
Secretary of Defense was preparing to implement new board procedures and the creation of 
the Afghanistan and Joint Task Force—the task force “charged with running all detention 
operations in Afghanistan, and more specifically, the Legal Operations Directorate of JTF 
435, the team responsible for the daily operations of the DRBs.”114 Notably and as discussed 
below, the Secretary of Defense’s July 2009 detention policy does not apply to approximately 
80% of American troops operating in Afghanistan.115 
An important note is that the 2009 procedures established by the President and 
Department of Defense are applicable only to the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan/Operation 
Enduring Freedom (USFOR-A/OEF), not the International and Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF); while forces of USFOR-A/OEF have all the power given by the President to detain 
individuals in Afghanistan, ISAF follows a different detainment policy.116 The major 
difference in detention authority between USFOR-A/OEF and ISAF is that “USFOR-A can 
                                                                                                                               
 113. Bovarnick, supra note 100, at 21. Once detained, the review board applies the procedures set forth 
in July 2009 by the Secretary of Defense in making initial detention decisions as well as during the 
regular review process. See id. 
 114. Id. at 11 (explaining that the changes to the board process were “designed to ensure that due 
process protections are afforded to the detainees housed at the new Detention Facility in Parwan 
(DFIP)”). Unfortunately, the D.C. Circuit’s May 2009 decision in Al Maqaleh v. Gates—which 
occurred after President Obama’s Executive Order but prior to the implementation of the Secretary 
of Defense’s new policies—did not analyze or discuss “the new procedure . . . put in place [at Parwan, 
and thus] the issue of how much process Parwan detainees should be afforded in their status 
hearings remains to be seen.” Id. at 48. 
 115. The 2009 policy change applies only to USFOR-A, which is composed of “U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (the capturing units), Joint Task Force 435, which runs all detention operations in 
Afghanistan . . . , and other critical enablers, such as route clearance and Palladin units.” Id. at 21. 
The remaining 80% plus of U.S. troops are deployed as part of the international ISAF mission; their 
very different detainment policy is discussed infra at note 117. This arrangement is further 
explained by Prescott: 
The status of military personnel who are part of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), the 
original U.S. mission in Afghanistan, is set out in an exchange of diplomatic notes between 
the U.S. and Afghanistan. Under this arrangement, Afghanistan agrees to waive criminal 
jurisdiction over these personnel, and to allow U.S. personnel and equipment freedom of 
movement into and within Afghanistan to conduct operations without the need to pay taxes 
and duties or to obtain visas. Specifically, U.S. personnel are “accorded a status equivalent 
to that accorded to the administrative and technical staff” of the U.S. Embassy, and are 
immune to Afghan criminal jurisdiction. The Parwan Detention Facility is considered an 
OEF mission. The other legal regime governing the presence of U.S. personnel is found in 
the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) and Afghanistan. The majority of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and almost all of 
the international forces, are covered by the MTA. Under its terms, Afghanistan has waived 
criminal, tax and customs jurisdiction over ISAF forces and has afforded them complete 
freedom of movement across its borders and within the country. 
 Prescott, supra note 31, at 41–42 (footnotes omitted). 
 116. See Bovarnick, supra note 100, at 21. The ISAF is part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan, and 
roughly 83% of U.S. forces in Afghanistan (nearly 78,500 out of 95,000 personnel) are assigned to 
ISAF. Id. The roughly 17,000 U.S. troops not assigned to ISAF fall under USFOR-A and continue to 
operate under the authority of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Id. 
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send captured personnel to the DFIP [Detention Facility in Parwan] whereas ISAF units 
(including the U.S. forces assigned to ISAF) cannot.”117 
In March 2011, President Obama signed an executive order related to the continuing 
status review of Guantanamo detainees.118 This order established Periodic Review Boards 
(PRBs) for all detainees and mandated an initial review for each detainee to occur no later 
than March 7, 2012.119 The greatest changes to the detainment review process included in 
the order include the right of detainees to be assisted by private counsel (although counsel 
will not be appointed or provided by the Government and thus must be retained privately by 
the detainee) and for the detainee himself to make an oral or written statement to the PRB, 
present information, answer the PRB’s questions, and call witnesses on his own behalf.120 If 
the PRB determines that the detainee should not be released, the Order states that 
“continued detention . . . shall be subject to subsequent full reviews and hearings by the PRB 
on a triennial basis.”121 Additionally, continued detainment will be “subject to a file review 
every 6 months in the intervening years between full reviews” and the detainee is not 
permitted to verbally address the PRB conducting a file review but may “make a written 
submission in connection with each file review.”122 The order provides that the file review will 
include any relevant new information about the detainee collected and compiled since the 
previous review and that “[i]f, during the file review, a significant question is raised as to 
whether the detainee’s continued detention is warranted . . . the PRB will promptly convene a 
full review.”123 
The detainment assessment and review process has undergone drastic changes between 
its inception in 2002 and President Obama’s 2011 Executive Order. Where initial 
determinations were made primarily on the basis of future intelligence gathering, recent 
changes have provided increasing amounts of traditional due process to detainees not only in 
                                                                                                                               
 117. Id. The policy for individuals captured by ISAF on the battlefield is as follows: 
All insurgents captured by ISAF troops must be turned over to the Afghan National 
Security Directorate (NDS), either within ninety-six hours [the general time frame since 
2005] for non-U.S. ISAF units or fourteen days for U.S. ISAF units [the U.S.-specific time 
frame since March 2010]. The NDS is Afghanistan’s domestic intelligence agency with 
jurisdiction over all insurgent and terrorist activity. In essence, the NDS has the right of 
first refusal to accept the transfer of captured personnel believed to be insurgents or 
terrorists. In addition to the personnel that might be expected to make up an intelligence 
agency, the NDS also has a staff of investigators that specifically work to prepare cases for 
prosecution within the Afghan criminal justice system. Currently, a team of Afghan 
prosecutors and judges with special expertise are temporarily assigned to work exclusively 
with the NDS to coordinate this effort to try suspected insurgents and terrorists under the 
appropriate Afghan criminal laws within the Afghan criminal justice system. Each province 
in Afghanistan has at least one judge and several prosecutors assigned to work on NDS 
cases. 
 Id. at 21–22 (footnotes omitted). 
 118. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011). 
 119. Id. § 3. 
 120. Id. § 3(a)(2)–(3). 
 121. Id. § 3(b). 
 122. Id. § 3(c). 
 123. Id. 
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Guantanamo, but in Afghanistan—where detainees do not currently have the power to 
challenge their detentions with habeas corpus.124 
IV.  Powell v. Alabama and the Significance of Value-Based Legal 
Representation 
When the Supreme Court struck down the convictions in the first round of the Scottsboro 
trials, the standards of zealous advocacy were customary at best. Unlike today, lawyers were 
not bound to ethical codes of conduct that imposed this duty.125 Nonetheless, representation 
of a criminal defendant by an individual inculcated in the lawyer ethos of zealousness was 
central to the Court’s decision. The Alabama Supreme Court had rejected Powell’s claim of 
denial of meaningful representation based on the events occurring on the day of his trial. 
When the cases were called, the trial judge noted that the defendants desired counsel, but did 
not have counsel. In response, he called upon the local bar to fill the void. Two lawyers 
apparently answered the call. This aspect of the trials was noted by the United States 
Supreme Court.126 However, for that Court, the fatal flaw around which all of the Justices 
coalesced was the unavoidable conclusion that whatever representation the defendants had 
received was at best pro forma, and did not comport with the customary standards of 
zealousness central to the lawyer ethos.127 
Zealous commitment to the interests of a client, even when disagreeing with the client’s 
cause or conduct, is indeed central to the lawyer ethos, and a fundamental foundation of 
meaningful representation. It is also central to the ethical obligations of a lawyer acting as an 
advocate, as indicated by the American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 
which charges lawyers to “zealously assert[] the client’s position under the rules of the 
adversary system.”128 
                                                                                                                               
 124. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the Military Commissions Act’s 
invocation of the Suspension Clause precludes detainees at Bagram, located outside the de jure 
sovereignty of the United States, from challenging their detention in federal district court using 
habeas corpus). 
 125. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (1983). 
 126. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53–56 (1932) (noting the casualness with which two attorneys, 
one of whom was from Tennessee and not a member of the Alabama Bar but nevertheless offered to 
assist in the defense, became counsel of record for the Scottsboro Boys on the day of trial). In 
criticizing the failure of the trial court to specifically appoint counsel, the Court noted: “until the 
very morning of the trial no lawyer had been named or definitely designated to represent the 
defendants.” Id. at 56. The Court then held that the trial court’s designation of the entire local bar 
as “counsel” for the defendants, an appointment made strictly for the purpose of arraignment, “even 
if made for all purposes, would, in our opinion, have fallen far short of meeting, in any proper sense, 
a requirement for the appointment of counsel.” Id. 
 127. Id. at 58 (“ ‘The record indicates that the appearance was rather pro forma than zealous and 
active . . . .’ Under the circumstances disclosed, we hold that defendants were not accorded the right 
of counsel in any substantial sense. To decide otherwise, would simply be to ignore actualities.”) 
 128. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, pmbl. § 2. However, the Preamble is purely aspirational, not a 
binding rule upon attorneys. Rule 1.3 states: “A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client.” Id. R. 1.3. While Rule 1.3 does not explicitly discuss a “zealous 
representation” requirement for attorneys, commentary to the Rules express the intent of the Rule’s 
drafters. In Comment 1 to Rule 1.3, the Model Rules state: 
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or 
personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are 
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The duty of zealousness is not something created by the Model Rules. Well before 
jurisdictions even began to codify ethical standards for the legal profession, commitment to a 
client’s cause and zealous advocacy of that cause have been at the core of the legal profession. 
One early and profoundly compelling example of this was John Adams’s representation of the 
British soldiers accused of murder for their part in the Boston Massacre.129 Adams risked the 
scorn of his community to fulfill his obligation to his clients, who were all acquitted. The 
history of American law is replete with other examples equally inspiring. In fact, one of those 
examples was part of the sordid story of the Scottsboro trials. 
After the Supreme Court overturned the original convictions, all of the defendants were 
retried. One of them, Haywood Patterson, was represented by Sam Leibowitz.130 Leibowitz, a 
lawyer from New York who immigrated to the United States with his family as a young boy, 
was hired by the International Labor Defense (a group associated with the Communist Party 
of America) to represent Patterson. Leibowitz threw himself into a truly hostile environment 
in the Alabama community of Decautor. Having amassed a remarkable record of seventy-
seven acquittals in seventy-eight first degree murder trials,131 Leibowitz devoted the next 
four years of his life to Patterson’s defense. Neither the urgings of his friends and family nor 
the routine threats to his life deterred him from his duty. 
Ultimately, Leibowitz fell short in his efforts, and Patterson was again convicted; 
Patterson was incarcerated until his successful escape in 1947. He died five years later of 
cancer while in a Michigan prison for an unrelated manslaughter conviction.132 
Nevertheless, Leibowitz’s commitment to perhaps the most vilified client in Alabama 
history stands to this day as a model of legal professionalism. Similar stories, although 
perhaps less dramatic, play out every day in the American legal system. The ability to 
distinguish the advocacy of a client’s legal cause from embracing that cause is a core aspect of 
zealous advocacy, and one of the most difficult concepts for new law students to understand. 
“How can anyone defend the guilty?” is a question most criminal law professors encounter 
                                                                                                                               
required to vindicate a client’s cause or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment 
and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s 
behalf. 
 Id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1. Similar Rules appear in customized State Rules of Professional Conduct. For 
example, Texas’s Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct state: 
[A] lawyer should act with competence, commitment and dedication to the interest of the 
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf. A lawyer should feel a moral or 
professional obligation to pursue a matter on behalf of a client with reasonable diligence and 
promptness despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer. 
 TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, R. 1.01 cmt. 6 (1989). 
 129. For a transcript of Adams’s defense speech, see Speech by John Adams at the Boston Massacre Trial, 
BOSTON MASSACRE HISTORICAL SOCIETY, http://www.bostonmassacre.net/trial/acct-adams1.htm 
(last visited Dec. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Adams’s Defense Speech]. 
 130. Leibowitz ultimately represented all of the Scottsboro Boys. Patterson’s trial was the second of four 
total. Ozie Powell, whose name appears in the style of cause for Powell v. Alabama, was tried with 
four of the other Boys after Patterson; Patterson was convicted within minutes of the Powell trial 
beginning. 
 131. Stanley F. Hammer, Lawyers Who Shaped America: Samuel Leibowitz, AM. INNS OF CT., 
http://www.innsofcourt.org/Content/Default.aspx?Id=6696 (last visited Dec. 11, 2012).  
 132. See Haywood Patterson, UNIV. OF MO.-KAN. CITY SCH. OF LAW, 
http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/scottsboro/SB_bPATT.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2012). 
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early in a student’s career. The clear answer appears in the pre-amble to the American Bar 
Association Model Rules of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers: “[A] lawyer zealously 
asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary system.”133 
Lawyers understand that this zealous advocacy, even when on behalf of an individual 
accused of the most heinous crime, ultimately contributes to justice and the rule of law 
because: 
[A] lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system 
and a public citizen are usually harmonious. Thus, when an opposing party is well 
represented, a lawyer can be a zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same 
time assume that justice is being done.134 
It is unlikely that the average non-lawyer understands the significance of this lawyer 
ethos. Few laypersons can reconcile the concept of justice with the effective representation of 
those who appear obviously guilty. But lawyers are educated on (and ostensibly understand) 
the true meaning of the presumption of innocence, and how zealous representation ensures 
individuals accused by the government are afforded the process they are due before that legal 
presumption is rebutted. Convicting the guilty is unquestionably important, but it is zealous 
representation of a defendant in the adversarial process that ensures the credibility of these 
convictions. As Justice Scalia famously wrote on the notion that ensuring all process due 
completely supersedes the interest in merely obtaining convictions in criminal charges, 
“[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing 
with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment 
prescribes.”135 
The relationship between zealous representation and legitimate criminal justice process 
has been central to the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.136 In its landmark opinion of Gideon 
v. Wainwright, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment (applied to the States through the 
Fourteenth Amendment as a component of fundamental due process rights) required more 
than merely the right to be represented; it required that the state provide for representation 
of indigent criminal defendants.137 The motivation for this decision was not merely the 
credibility of the criminal justice process. Instead, it was protection of individuals from post-
conviction incarceration without meaningful process. Because all of these concerns were 
inextricably intertwined in Gideon’s challenge, the Court explicitly addressed only the right to 
                                                                                                                               
 133. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. § 2 (1983). 
 134. Id. at § 8. 
 135. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004). 
 136. The Sixth Amendment guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The 
Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. Through selective incorporation, the 
Supreme Court has held the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applicable against the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 
(1963) (holding that “a provision of the Bill of Rights which is ‘fundamental and essential to a fair 
trial’ is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment” and that the right to 
counsel is one of those fundamental and essential rights) (citing Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 465 
(1942), overruled by Gideon, 372 U.S. 335). 
 137. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344–45. 
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counsel in the criminal justice process. However, the Court’s subsequent jurisprudence 
determining the scope of the Gideon right to counsel indicates that protection of the liberty 
interest, and not merely protection from false conviction, is the dominant interest related to 
this right. 
Gideon did not clearly delineate situations that trigger the right of government provided 
counsel to indigent criminal defendants. In Scott v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that the 
Gideon right to counsel applied whenever an individual was charged with a crime that 
resulted in conviction and even a single day of criminal incarceration.138 The Court rejected 
the proposal to use the felony-misdemeanor dichotomy as the trigger for the right; however, 
the Court also rejected the proposal to extend the right to any individual charged with a 
criminal offense.139 Instead, it was the combined effect of a criminal charge and incarceration 
that created a sufficient interest to justify imposing a burden on the government to provide 
counsel to indigent defendants. Referring to an earlier decision that was less emphatic on the 
issue, the Court concluded: 
 In Argersinger, the Court rejected arguments that social cost or a lack of available 
lawyers militated against its holding, in some part because it thought these arguments 
were factually incorrect. But they were rejected in much larger part because of the 
Court’s conclusion that incarceration was so severe a sanction that it should not be 
imposed as a result of a criminal trial unless an indigent defendant had been offered 
appointed counsel to assist in his defense, regardless of the cost to the States implicit in 
such a rule.140  
This incarceration trigger remains in effect to this day. Accordingly, even defendants 
charged with minor misdemeanor offenses are entitled to free representation in the event 
that their sentence includes any confinement.141 In contrast, a defendant charged with a 
serious felony would not have a similar right in the odd event that the judge’s punishment did 
not include confinement. 
It is of course true that criminal adjudication is the only context in which this 
incarceration standard applies. However, the Supreme Court’s focus on incarceration as the 
trigger for the right of representation is indicative of perhaps a broader principle: zealous 
representation is an essential safeguard to protect the interests of individuals subjected to 
incarceration. Although not cast in terms of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, this 
principle was a significant element in one of the rare Supreme Court decisions addressing the 
constitutionality of non-punitive preventive detention. In United States v. Salerno, the Court 
                                                                                                                               
 138. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 367 (1979) (holding that a court is not required “to appoint counsel for 
a criminal defendant . . . who is charged with a statutory offense for which imprisonment upon 
conviction is authorized but not [actually] imposed”). 
 139. See id. at 373–74 (“[T]he Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution 
require only that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the 
State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense” after determining 
that “actual imprisonment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of 
imprisonment . . . [and thus an actual sentence of imprisonment is the proper] line defining the 
constitutional right to appointment of counsel.”). 
 140. Id. at 372–73 (citations omitted). 
 141. See id. at 373. See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (“Under the rule we announce 
today, every judge will know when the trial of a misdemeanor starts that no imprisonment may be 
imposed, even though local law permits it, unless the accused is represented by counsel.”). 
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assessed the constitutionality of a preventive detention provision included within the Bail 
Reform Act of 1984.142 Salerno, an alleged high-level mafia leader, was pending trial for 
serious federal criminal offenses.143 Pursuant to the authority provided by Congress in the 
Bail Reform Act, Salerno was subjected to preventive pretrial detention. The basis for this 
detention was not that Salerno represented a flight risk or danger to the judicial process (the 
traditional bases for depriving an individual charged with an offense of liberty prior to trial), 
but that he presented a threat of serious future criminal misconduct, proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence.144 
Salerno challenged the statute, asserting that the authorization for preventive pretrial 
detention based on risk of future criminal misconduct was inconsistent with the presumption 
of innocence and due process. The Court rejected Salerno’s challenge, holding that the Act did 
not contravene the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.145 The Court’s holding was based 
on both a substantive and procedural foundation. From a substantive due process 
perspective, the Court concluded that the normal process associated with criminal 
adjudication is triggered only when an individual is subjected to punitive detention, and not 
administrative detention.146 By characterizing the preventive detention authorized by the 
Bail Reform Act as non-punitive, the court effectively exempted the detention from the 
normal due process standards associated with incarceration.147 However, the Court 
                                                                                                                               
 142. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (“If, after a hearing . . . 
the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the 
appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person and the community, such 
judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.”); id. at (e)(2)–(3) (stating 
conditions that, if applicable to the instant case, create “a rebuttable presumption . . . that no 
condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety of any other person and the 
community”). 
 143. Specifically, Salerno and a codefendant were charged with twenty-nine violations of the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Salerno, 481 U.S. at 743. 
 144. The Bail Reform Act provided that “[i]f, after a hearing . . . the judicial officer finds that no condition 
or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and 
the safety of any other person and the community, he shall order the detention of the person prior to 
trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1). The Act also set forth criteria for the judicial officer to consider in 
making a pretrial detainment decision, including the types of crimes to which the Act applied, as 
well as a number of other factors: “the nature and seriousness of the charges, the substantiality of 
the Government’s evidence against the arrestee, the arrestee’s background and characteristics, and 
the nature and seriousness of the danger [to any person or to the community] posed by the suspect’s 
release.” Salerno, 481 U.S. at 742–43 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)). 
 145. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750–51 (“[In] circumstances where the government’s interest is sufficiently 
weighty, [the individual’s strong interest in liberty may] be subordinated to the greater needs of 
society.” In application, “[w]hen the Government proves by clear and convincing evidence that an 
arrestee presents an identified and articulable threat to an individual or the community, we believe 
that, consistent with the Due Process Clause, a court may disable the arrestee from executing that 
threat.”). 
 146. See id. at 764 (comparing Salerno’s post-indictment pretrial administrative detention to lawful pre-
indictment administrative detention occurring prior to a probable cause hearing and determining 
that “a period of administrative detention may occur before the evidence of probable cause is 
presented to a neutral magistrate”) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975)). 
 147. See id. at 746 (“[T]he mere fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclusion 
that the government has imposed punishment.”). 
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emphasized the importance of providing for a meaningful adjudicative process before an 
individual may be subjected to non-punitive detention.148 
The Court concluded that the process established for authorizing preventive detention 
pursuant to the Bail Reform Act met this process. That process included both an adversarial 
hearing and a right to counsel. The Court emphasized the significance of this process, and the 
ability of an individual subjected to preventive detention to test the government’s allegation 
in this adversarial process. Salerno therefore bolsters the assumption that it is the risk of 
incarceration, and not necessarily the punitive purpose for the incarceration, that implicates 
the critical importance of zealous representation. 
The United States also recognizes a right to effective assistance of counsel in limited non-
criminal, non-detention circumstances. The preeminent example occurs in immigration 
removal proceedings, where a noncitizen faces deportation from the United States. While this 
right was questioned in 2009, years of U.S. immigration policy support the notion that aliens 
facing removal are entitled to the effective assistance of counsel, and that ineffective 
assistance of counsel at removal proceedings entitles an alien to reopen the proceeding under 
certain circumstances.149 The reversal of policy occurred in January 2009, just days before 
Barack Obama took office, when then-Attorney General Michael Mukasey determined that 
“[a]liens in removal proceedings have no right to counsel, including Government-appointed 
counsel, under the Sixth Amendment . . . [or] under the Fifth Amendment.”150 Mukasey’s 
decision reversed over twenty years of immigration law precedent.151 While Mukasey 
acknowledged that aliens facing deportation “have a statutory privilege to retain private 
counsel,” he determined that as “removal proceedings are civil in nature,” they do not trigger 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the Sixth Amendment “applies only to 
criminal proceedings.”152 Mukasey further determined that removal proceedings also do not 
implicate any right to counsel under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause because 
although “the Fifth Amendment applies to removal proceedings, its guarantee of due process 
                                                                                                                               
 148. Id. at 751–52 (discussing the process required by the Bail Reform Act to justify a preventative 
detention). See also 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)(2)(B) (2008). The Bail Reform Act required a number of 
safeguards at the hearing, even if the hearing did not need to abide by federal evidence admissibility 
rules: 
At the hearing, such person has the right to be represented by counsel, and, if financially 
unable to obtain adequate representation, to have counsel appointed. The person shall be 
afforded an opportunity to testify, to present witnesses, to cross-examine witnesses who 
appear at the hearing, and to present information by proffer or otherwise. 
 Id. 
 149. See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (B.I.A. 1988). Lozada held that 
[a]ny right a respondent in deportation proceedings may have to counsel is grounded in the 
fifth amendment guarantee of due process. Ineffective assistance of counsel in a deportation 
proceeding is a denial of due process only if the proceeding was so fundamentally unfair that 
the alien was prevented from reasonably presenting his case. One must show, moreover, 
that he was prejudiced by his representative’s performance. 
 Id. at 638 (citations omitted). This framework was affirmed in 2003. See Assaad, 23 I. & N. Dec. 553, 
556 (B.I.A. 2003). 
 150. Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 710 (B.I.A. 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 2009). 
 151. See Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 637. 
 152. See Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 710. 
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does not include a general right to counsel, or a specific right to effective assistance of 
counsel.”153 
Six months later, Eric Holder, President Obama’s Attorney General, reversed Mukasey’s 
decision.154 While Holder did not explicitly recognize a right to appointed counsel in 
deportation cases, he did direct the Board of Immigration Appeals and immigration judges to 
“apply the pre-Compean standards to all pending and future motions to reopen based upon 
ineffective assistance of counsel,” and made an interim determination that the Board of 
Immigration Appeals has discretion “to reopen removal proceedings . . . to consider claims of 
ineffective assistance of counsel based on conduct of counsel that occurred after a final order 
of removal had been entered.”155 Thus, Holder recognized that aliens facing deportation have 
some right to counsel, as the ineffective assistance of even private counsel in immigration 
proceedings could result in a deprivation of the alien’s constitutional due process rights. 
Under the paradigms of pretrial incarceration and deportation, it is clear that the 
government recognizes that effective assistance of counsel is necessary to safeguard due 
process interests. The courts and even the executive branch have realized that the process 
due to a person facing incarceration or removal from the country involves some degree of 
constitutionally-sufficient representation, regardless of whether the defendant or removal 
respondent is entitled to appointed representation or must privately secure a lawyer. Zealous 
representation thus represents something so closely related to due process as to be nearly 
inseparable; when a person faces the risk of incarceration or deportation and that person is 
                                                                                                                               
 153. Id. Mukasey elaborated that the Fifth Amendment “is violated only by state action, namely, action 
that can be legally attributed to the Government. Lawyers privately retained by aliens in removal 
proceedings are not state actors for due process purposes. Accordingly, there is no Fifth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.” Id. The basis of Mukasey’s argument 
was Supreme Court jurisprudence on the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: 
The Supreme Court has recognized constitutional claims for ineffective assistance of 
counsel only where a person has a constitutional right to a Government-appointed lawyer. 
In contrast to a defendant in a criminal case, an alien has no right—constitutional or 
statutory—to Government-appointed counsel in an administrative removal proceeding. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . [T]he Constitution does not confer a constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel 
in removal proceedings. The reason is simple: Under Supreme Court precedent, there is no 
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel under the Due Process Clause or any 
other provision where—as here and as in most civil proceedings—there is no constitutional 
right to counsel, including Government-appointed counsel, in the first place. Therefore, 
although the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies in removal proceedings, as it 
does in any civil lawsuit or in any administrative proceeding, that Clause does not entitle an 
alien to effective assistance of counsel, much less the specific remedy of a second bite at the 
apple based on the mistakes of his own lawyer. 
. . . . 
. . . It is well established that, as a general matter, there is no constitutional right to counsel, 
and thus no constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, in civil cases. Instead, the 
rule is that counsel’s errors are imputed to the client who chose his counsel, and that the 
client’s sole remedy is a suit for malpractice against counsel and not a litigation do-over. 
 Id. at 712, 714, 718 (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted). 
 154. See Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (B.I.A. 2009). 
 155. Id. at 3. 
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denied effective assistance of counsel in defending against the risk, the government cannot 
say that the defendant received all the process due under the Constitution. 
V.  Extending Legal Representation to the Long-Term Detention 
Process 
A. Adopting a Punitive/Administrative Divide in the War on Terror 
Providing counsel for an individual subjected to the risk of punitive incarceration is also a 
central component of the legitimacy of the U.S. military justice system. In fact, the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) exceeds the requirements of the Sixth Amendment by 
requiring defense counsel for any individual charged for trial by court-martial that may result 
in a federal criminal conviction.156 Even defendants who are not sentenced to punitive 
incarceration are entitled to the assistance of detailed military counsel, irrespective of their 
ability to pay for their own representation.157 
When President Bush issued the order for the creation of a military commission to try 
captured unlawful enemy combatants following the September 11th terrorist attacks, he 
adopted the same right to counsel rule applicable to courts-martial. That order included the 
requirement that military counsel be detailed to defend any individual charged for trial by 
military commission.158 Although this order and the military commission it created became 
the subject of substantial criticism and ultimate invalidation by the Supreme Court, the 
provision of legal representation was one bright spot in the commission process. The 
experienced and highly competent military defense lawyers detailed to this duty threw 
themselves into the task of defending their clients and identifying every conceivable flaw in 
                                                                                                                               
 156. The accused has the right to be represented by counsel during an investigation and at trial. Article 
27 provides the qualifications for trial counsel and defense counsel. Article 32 provides the right of 
an accused to be represented by counsel at investigation, and Article 38 provides the same right at 
trial. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 827(a), 832(b), 838(b) (2006). Under the UCMJ, an accused does not have a 
right to be represented at a summary court-martial. However, these courts do not issue federal 
criminal convictions. Further, a defendant at a summary court-martial is provided free counsel to 
prepare for and appeal the results of the court-martial. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 838(b)(1), (c). 
 157. See generally id. 
 158. See DEPT. OF DEF., MILITARY COMMISSION ORDER NO. 1 § 4(C) (Mar. 21, 2002). In Section 4(C)(2), 
the Department of Defense provides for defense of an accused at a military commission trial: 
[T]he Chief Defense Counsel [defined in section 4(C)(1)] shall detail one or more Military 
Officers who are judge advocates of any United States armed force to conduct the defense for 
each case before a Commission (“Detailed Defense Counsel”). The duties of the Detailed 
Defense Counsel are: 
(a) To defend the Accused zealously within the bounds of the law without regard to 
personal opinion as to the guilt of the Accused; and 
(b) To represent the interests of the Accused in any review process as provided by this 
Order. 
 Id. § 4(C)(2)(a)–(b). Defendants in military commission trials were also given the right to replace 
their Detailed Defense Counsel with a different JAG lawyer, and could retain the services of a 
civilian attorney meeting certain defined qualifications. Id. § 4(C)(3). While a defendant could 
replace one JAG defense attorney for another, the Order did not give defendants the right to proceed 
without any JAG defense counsel at all. See id. § 4(C)(4) (“The Accused must be represented at all 
relevant times by Detailed Defense Counsel.”). 
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the commission process. Their efforts were applauded by virtually all critics of the military 
commission, and ultimately resulted in not only successful challenges on behalf of their 
clients, but also to recognition by the American Civil Liberties Union.159 
For experts in military law, the efforts of these defense lawyers were unsurprising. 
Military lawyers, like their civilian counterparts, are taught to embrace the ethical obligation 
to zealously represent their clients, even when those clients are extremely unpopular. Within 
each military service, the Judge Advocate General (the senior legal officer for the service) has 
established a separate military defenders office. Military lawyers assigned to these 
organizations operate under a chain of command distinct from that of their prosecution 
counterparts, and are constantly reminded of the importance of their independent and 
zealous commitment to their clients.160 
For observers outside the military, however, the commitment of the military lawyers 
representing Guantanamo defendants charged with engaging in heinous acts of terror 
against the United States seemed surprising. How could members of an institution charged 
with the responsibility of engaging in combat against these individuals devote themselves to 
such representation? The answer to this question is inherent in the concept of zealous 
representation. The lawyers assigned to these duties understood intuitively that by 
                                                                                                                               
 159. 2007 Roger N. Baldwin Medal of Liberty Award, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/2007-roger-n-baldwin-
medal-liberty-award (last visited Nov. 23, 2012) (listing the five JAG officers, at least one from each 
branch of the armed forces, who received the award in 2005 for their defense of Guantanamo 
detainees). 
 160. See DEPT. OF THE ARMY, MILITARY JUSTICE: ARMY REGULATION 27-10 § 6-3 (Nov. 16, 2005), available 
at http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r27_10.pdf. Chapter 6 of AR 27-10 describes the United States 
Army Trial Defense Service (USATDS), which provides counsel to defendants in Army courts-
martial. Id. Section 6-3 describes the ultimate command structure of USATDS as follows: 
USATDS counsel are supervised, managed, and rated solely by their respective USATDS 
supervisory chain. Staff judge advocate and installation support responsibilities for TDS 
[Trial Defense Service] counsel apply, regardless of the TDA [table of distribution and 
allowances] or modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE) authorization that 
the individual TDS counsel occupies. The Commander and Commandant, TJAGLCS [The 
Judge-Advocate General’s Legal Center and School], provide professional control and 
supervision of USATDS and its counsel, including UCMJ authority. The Commander, 
USALSA [U.S. Army Legal Services Agency], exercises other command functions for 
USATDS counsel. 
 Id. § 6-3. The USATDS as a whole is overseen by a Chief, designated by the Judge-Advocate General 
of the Army (TJAG). Id. § 6-3(a). Below the Chief are the Regional Defense Counsel (RDC), who is 
“[r]esponsible for the performance of the USATDS mission within a region [and is] [t]he supervisor 
of all senior defense counsel within the region.” Id. § 6-3(c)(1). A region is “the major subordinate 
supervisory and control element of USATDS. . . . encompass[ing] a geographical area designated by 
TJAG.” Id. § 6-3(b). Below the RDC is the senior defense counsel, who is “responsible for the 
performance of the USATDS mission within the area serviced by a field office” as well as “the direct 
supervisor of all trial defense counsel within a field office,” including its subsidiary branch offices. 
Id. § 6-3(f)(1). At the bottom of the hierarchy are trial defense counsel, whose job is “to represent 
Soldiers in courts-martial, administrative boards, and other proceedings and act as consulting 
counsel as required by law or regulations.” Id. § 6-3(g). The USATDS is therefore fully self-
contained, and not subject to the supervisory control of a base commander, unlike JAG prosecutors; 
trial defense counsel and their superiors effectively report only to TJAG himself. This separate 
command structure is crucial to trial defense counsel’s ability to zealously represent defendants at 
courts-martial. 
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advocating on behalf of their clients they in no way endorsed the causes of their clients.161 
Instead, like all professional defense lawyers they recognized that their efforts would 
ultimately contribute to the credibility and legitimacy of justice dispensed by the military 
commission. 
The critical role of zealous representation in the military commission process would, 
ironically, be central to the downfall of the President’s commission. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 
the Supreme Court struck down the legality of the military commission convened pursuant to 
Military Order No. 1.162 The issue that brought the case before the Court was a challenge to 
the rule permitting the exclusion of the defendant from the proceeding. While defendant’s 
counsel would be present for all proceedings, the rule prohibited defense counsel from 
disclosing to the excluded client what transpired in his absence. The Supreme Court held that 
this rule violated both the minimum standards for fair process included within the Geneva 
Conventions and the procedural requirements of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
applicable to military commissions.163 
Congress responded to the Hamdan decision with the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 
its statutory resurrection of the military commission.164 Congress, like the President, 
provided for the appointment of military counsel for any individual charged for trial by the 
new commission. However, unlike the original commission, the MCA did not permit exclusion 
of the accused from court proceedings (except for good cause, such as disruption of the 
proceedings). Congress even added a right to a “learned” defense counsel for all capital cases. 
Like their pre-MCA counterparts, the military counsel detailed to defend unlawful enemy 
combatants at the military commission continue to embrace the highest standards of ethical 
performance. 
The provision of legal representation for individuals captured in the context of the Global 
War on Terror has, however, been restricted to the criminal prosecution context. No 
analogous provision had, prior to the NDAA 2012, been extended to individuals subject to 
non-criminal preventive detention. Nonetheless, non-criminal detentions account for the vast 
majority of individuals subjected to wartime indefinite detention power.165 And, as former 
                                                                                                                               
 161. Acceptance of this understanding permeates legal training at all levels. See, e.g., AIR FORCE RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2005) (“A lawyer’s representation of a client, including representation 
by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s economic, social, or moral views 
or activities.”). 
 162. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 163. See id. at 630–31, 634–35 (finding Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applicable to the 
conflict with al-Qaeda, and thus requiring Hamdan to be tried under a court constituted as Common 
Article 3 required). Additionally, the Court held that there was no “evident practical need” for 
military commission procedure to deviate from procedures applicable to courts-martial under the 
UCMJ. Id. at 634 (quoting Justice Kennedy’s concurrence). See also GPW, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(d) 
(prohibiting “the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions [against people who are 
hors de combat in armed conflicts not of an international character] without previous judgment 
pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are 
recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples”) (emphasis added). 
 164. See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 948a–49o (2006). 
 165. As of January 2012, 171 detainees remained at Guantanamo, while about 600 had been transferred 
out; thus about 771 individuals have been detained at Guantanamo since 2001. See Carol 
Rosenberg, Why Obama Hasn’t Closed Guantanamo Camps, MIAMI HERALD (Jan. 7, 2012), 
www.miamiherald.com/2012/01/07/v-fullstory/2578082/why-obama-hasnt-closed-guantanamo.html 
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Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld noted when use of military commissions was initially 
announced, an acquittal by these tribunals would not necessarily result in release of 
detainees.166 Instead, it was more probable that an acquitted detainee would simply be 
returned to non-punitive preventive detention.167 
                                                                                                                               
(stating that 171 men are still being detained at Guantanamo); Charlie Savage et al., Classified 
Files Offer New Insights into Detainees, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/world/guantanamo-files-lives-in-an-american-
limbo.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (stating that 600 detainees had been transferred to other 
countries as of April 2011 and that a total of 766 detainee assessments occurred at Guantanamo 
since 2001). At Bagram, near Kabul, Afghanistan, the number of prisoners has varied: around 450 
detainees were at Bagram in July 2005. Ron Synovitz, Afghanistan: Manhunt Continues for Four 
Suspected Al-Qaeda Fighters, RADIO FREE EUROPE RADIO LIBERTY (July 12, 2005), 
http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1059859.html. This number grew to 645 by September 2009, 
ACLU Obtains List of Bagram Detainees, ACLU.ORG (Jan. 15, 2010), http://www.aclu.org/national-
security/aclu-obtains-list-bagram-detainees, then shrank to 600 detainees by the time President 
Obama took office in January 2011, Seth Doane & Phil Hirschkorn, Bagram: The Other 
Guantanamo?, CBS NEWS (Nov. 13, 2011, 7:11 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-
57323856/bagram-the-other-guantanamo/. The number grew again to roughly 1700 in May 2011, 
John Hanrahan, Bagram Prison, Bigger than Guantanamo, Its Prisoners in Limbo, Cries Out for 
Some News Coverage, NIEMAN WATCHDOG (May 31, 2011), 
http://www.niemanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=00546, and 
then to allegedly 3000 in November 2011, Doane & Hirschkorn, supra. By contrast, as of January 
2010, only 11 individuals had been charged with violations of the laws of war or providing material 
support to terrorism by military commission; at least two of them (Binyam Mohammed and 
Mohamed Jawad) had all charges against them dropped, and two (David Hicks and Salim Hamdan; 
the latter was Osama bin Laden’s driver) were sentenced, served their sentences (and in the case of 
Hamdan, received over five years of time served from his detention), and were released to other 
countries. See Military Commissions Cases, MILITARY COMMISSIONS, 
http://www.mc.mil/CASES/MilitaryCommissions.aspx (full list of individuals with causes charged or 
dismissed by a military commission) (last visited Nov. 23, 2012). See also Ken Gude, Criminal 
Courts Are Tougher on Terrorists than Military Detention, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS (Jan. 
20, 2010), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/01/criminal_courts_terrorists.html (noting 
that “[s]ince their formation in November 2001, military commissions have only had one trial, 
negotiated one plea bargain, and convicted one defendant after he boycotted the proceedings,” and 
further noting that the military commission trial of Hamdan—the only man since 2001 to truly 
stand trial by U.S. military commission—“resulted in a split verdict—the military jury acquitted 
him of conspiracy and returned a guilty verdict only on the charge of material support for 
terrorism”). 
 166. During a news briefing on March 28, 2002, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld made the 
following statements regarding detainee acquittal before a military commission and possible release 
following acquittal: 
There have been some murmurs in the media about detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, 
and specifically whether if one who is tried by a military commission and, if acquitted, 
whether they would then be released or whether they would still be detained. . . . 
. . . . 
. . . If one were to be acquitted by a commission of . . . a specific criminal charge, that would 
not necessarily change the fact that that individual remains an enemy who was captured 
during an armed conflict, and therefore one who could reasonably be expected to go back to 
his terrorist ways if released. . . . In some cases it might not be possible to establish beyond a 
reasonable doubt that an individual committed a particular crime, and therefore he might 
be acquitted of that crime. However, it does not change the fact that he is an enemy 
combatant. He may be guilty of other crimes, but at the minimum he is someone to be kept 
off the battlefield . . . . 
Even in a case where an enemy combatant might be acquitted, the United States would 
be irresponsible not to continue to detain them until the conflict is over. Detaining enemy 
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The almost inevitable reality of indefinite detention has, however, spurred a credible effort 
to enhance to the preventive detention process. This effort first focused on Guantanamo—
initially in response to the Supreme Court’s extension of habeas jurisdiction to Guantanamo 
detainees and the Court’s suggestion that enhanced process might eliminate the necessity for 
judicial review.168 The Court would ultimately backtrack on this suggestion when it held in 
Boumediene v. Bush that the process implemented by the President did not sufficiently 
protect the rights of Guantanamo detainees, who were therefore constitutionally entitled to 
challenge their detention by writ of habeas corpus.169 However, by that time, the process 
established by order of the Secretary of Defense had been endorsed and enhanced by 
Congress in the form of the Detainee Treatment Act (as supplemented by the Military 
Commission Act). 
The combined effect of executive, legislative, and judicial action led to a military detention 
review hearing to determine who qualifies for indefinite detention at Guantanamo (the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunal), an annual review by military authorities to determine 
whether continued detention at Guantanamo remains justified (called the Annual Review 
Board until March 2011), and judicial review of military detention decisions by the District of 
Columbia District and Circuit Courts. While this process has resulted in the reclassification 
                                                                                                                               
combatants for the duration of a conflict is universally recognized as responsible and lawful. 
This is fully consistent with the Geneva Conventions and other war authorities. 
 News Briefing, Dep’t of Def., Donald Rumsfeld, Sec’y of Def. (Mar. 28, 2002, 1:30 PM), available at 
http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3380. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). A plurality of the Court held that Hamdi, as an 
American citizen, had a right to challenge his detention; however, the Court limited the resources 
due to Hamdi in making such a challenge while noting that at least some core constitutional 
protections must be preserved and made available to citizen enemy combatants: 
[W]hile the full protections that accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may 
prove unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting, the threats to military 
operations posed by a basic system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a 
citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the Government’s case and to be heard by an 
impartial adjudicator. 
 Id. at 535. On the same day that the Court handed down Hamdi, it released its opinion in Rasul, 
holding that individuals detained at Guantanamo were entitled to challenge their detention by filing 
statutorily-authorized writs of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of 
Columbia. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 485 (2004), superseded by statute, Military Commissions Act 
of 2006 § 7(a), Pub.L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006), as recognized in Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 
F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In holding that the principles set forth in Johnson v. Eisentrager did not 
apply to the U.S. facility at Guantanamo, the Court considered the historical reach of habeas corpus 
in ultimately determining that 
[a]pplication of the habeas statute to persons detained at the base is consistent with the 
historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus. At common law, courts exercised habeas 
jurisdiction over the claims of aliens detained within sovereign territory of the realm, as well 
as the claims of persons detained in the so-called “exempt jurisdictions,” where ordinary 
writs did not run, and all other dominions under the sovereign’s control. 
 Id. at 481–82 (citations omitted). See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3) (granting federal district courts 
statutory authority to hear habeas claims asserted by any person “within their respective 
jurisdictions” who claims to be held “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of 
the United States”). 
 169. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
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of a number of detainees,170 legal representation is provided only when cases reach Article III 
judicial review on writs of habeas corpus. Prior to the President’s March 2011 Executive 
Order, no legal representation was provided to detainees before either the CSRT or the ARB. 
Instead, in an apparent analogy to the procedures established by the Geneva Convention 
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War171 for resolving uncertainty as to whether a 
captive qualifies as a prisoner of war, detainees were provided with a U.S. military officer to 
serve as a non-legal representative at the CSRT (the ARB was a “paper” review so no 
representation was provided).172 
An analogous evolution of detention review procedure has occurred at the U.S. detention 
facility in Bagram, Afghanistan.173 Ironically, while Guantanamo has been the focal point of 
the majority of scrutiny, the Bagram-Parwan operation accounts for the vast majority of 
individuals who have been and continue to be subjected to preventive detention by the United 
States.174 However, a serious effort to revise the detention process in order to mitigate the 
risk of invalid detentions has only recently been implemented. As will be explained in the 
next section, this effort resulted in a process analogous to the CSRT process at Guantanamo. 
This process has undoubtedly improved the credibility of the U.S. detention operation in 
Afghanistan and added substantial protections to potential detainees; however, as at 
Guantanamo, the Department of Defense did not provide legal representation to Afghanistan 
detainees as part of this revision. Instead, an approach analogous to the “prisoner’s 
representative” approach in the GPW was extended to Afghanistan.175 
                                                                                                                               
 170. See COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNAL SUMMARY, supra note 71; Stuck in Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 21, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/21/world/americas/21iht-gitmo.html (stating 
that as of April 2006, the ARBs had determined that while three detainees could be released and 
107 could be repatriated to the custody of their home countries, all still remained detained in 
Guantanamo at that time). 
 171. See GPW, supra note 25, art. 5 (granting detainees whose POW status is in question “the protection 
of the present Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent 
tribunal”). 
 172. See CSRT Order, supra note 84, ¶ (c) (describing the nature of the detainee’s non-legal personal 
representative). See generally CSRT Procedures, supra note 1, encl. (1); ARB Procedures, supra note 
91, encl. (3)–(4). See also GPW, supra note 25, art. 5 (“Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, 
having committed a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to any of 
the categories enumerated in Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present 
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal.”). 
 173. See discussion supra Part III.B.3. 
 174. In early 2008, around 630 individuals were detained at Bagram, compared to the 275 at 
Guantanamo. Andrew Gumbel, Bagram Detention Centre Now Twice the Size of Guantanamo, THE 
INDEPENDENT, (Jan. 8, 2008), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/bagram-detention-
centre-now-twice-the-size-of-guantanamo-768803.html. By 2011, Bagram housed over 1700 
detainees: almost triple the number detained there in 2008 at the end of the Bush Administration. 
Justin Elliott, The Gitmo No One Talks About, SALON (June 4, 2011), 
http://www.salon.com/2011/06/04/bagram_obama_gitmo/. As of May 2011, only 171 detainees were 
still at Guantanamo. Afghan Inmate Dies at Guantanamo in ‘Suicide’, SKY NEWS (May 19, 2011), 
http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/15994893. 
 175. The term “prisoners’ representative” is used in several articles of the Third Geneva Convention. 
Prisoners’ representatives under the Prisoner of War Convention are appointed in one of the 
following ways: (1) if the detainment camp consists solely of officers or a mix of officers and non-
officers, the “senior officer among the prisoners of war shall be recognized as the camp prisoners’ 
representative”; or (2) if there are no officers among the POWs, “the prisoners shall freely elect by 
secret ballot, every six months, and also in case of vacancies, prisoners’ representatives.” GPW, 
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Before turning to an overview of the revisions to the detainee review process, a brief 
discussion of the flaw in the GPW analogy is in order. As one of the authors has previously 
written, while it is common to invoke the limited process afforded to prisoners of war 
pursuant to the GPW as a justification for limiting the procedural rights of unprivileged 
belligerents, this argument is fundamentally flawed.176 A POW and an unprivileged 
belligerent do share the common consequences of their belligerency and capture: preventive 
detention for the duration of hostilities. However, beyond this the analogy between these two 
categories of wartime detainees dissipates. POW status is defined by treaty, and therefore the 
procedural protections established by the GPW for POWs are premised on the underlying 
assumption that the individuals accorded those protections fall into a clearly defined 
category. As a result, these protections are not focused primarily on resolving the complex 
question of whether a captive should or should not be subjected to preventive detention, but 
                                                                                                                               
supra note 25, art. 79. The duty of the prisoner representatives is to “represent[] [prisoners] before 
the military authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of the Red Cross and 
any other organization which may assist them,” and to ensure that the representative actually 
represents the interests of the relevant group, a prisoner representative must “have the same 
nationality, language and customs as the prisoners of war whom he represents.” Id. 
 176. See Geoffrey S. Corn, Enemy Combatants and Access to Habeas Corpus: Questioning the Validity of 
the Prisoner of War Analogy, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 236, 249 (2007). The relevant portion of this 
article discusses the process for POW determination: POW determinations under the Prisoner of 
War Convention are made pursuant to an Article 5 tribunal applying the POW status qualification 
criteria established by Article 4, but Article 4 is itself unreachable unless Common Article 2 applies 
to the armed conflict in which the individual was captured. See id. See also GPW, supra note 25, art. 
2 (“the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict 
which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not 
recognized by one of them”) (emphasis added). As the author describes, Common Article 2 
applicability—the predicate requirement for applying Article 4 POW criteria at an Article 5 status 
tribunal, and the predicate for even requiring such a tribunal in the first place—requires an “inter-
state dispute[] involving the intervention of armed forces. Accordingly, Article 4 is never applicable 
in any other kind of armed conflict.” Corn, supra, at 248 (citations omitted). As the author noted, the 
fact that the United States is not in an armed conflict with another sovereign nation, but instead is 
combating a transnational non-state entity, 
is the principal basis for the United States’ determination that captured al Qaeda warriors 
are conclusively presumed to be excluded from POW status. Although the armed conflict 
that the United States asserts exists between this transnational organization and the 
United States is international in scope, there is not even a credible argument that al Qaeda 
satisfies the requirements necessary to be considered a state. While it is plausible that such 
personnel might have been associated with the armed conflict between the United States 
and Afghanistan during the initial phases of Operation Enduring Freedom, so long as the 
United States persists in treating the armed conflict with al Qaeda as distinct from armed 
conflicts with sponsoring states, the predicate requirement of “right kind of conflict” cannot 
be satisfied. Accordingly, personnel captured in association with this armed conflict do not 
benefit from the provision of the Prisoner of War Convention. Assuming, however, that the 
initial “right kind of conflict” requirement is satisfied, the second requirement that 
individuals captured during such a conflict meet the Article 4 POW qualification criteria, or 
that the individual detainee is the “right kind of person,” still must be met. 
 Id. at 248–50 (citations omitted). The author continues in asserting that Article 4 criteria have not 
be met by al-Qaeda forces in the past, because their organizational structure, lack of a fixed 
distinctive sign or emblem, failure to openly carry arms and, arguably most important, disregard for 
conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of war, prevent such warriors 
from being classified as POWs under the Third Geneva Convention. See id. at 250–52. See also 
GPW, supra note 25, art. 4 (setting forth criteria which, if met and proved at an Article 5 hearing, 
require a captured individual to continue to receive POW status). 
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instead on ensuring that the rights established by the treaty are respected by the Detaining 
Power. Even Article 5 of the GPW—the only provision of the treaty addressing a status 
determination procedure—reflects this reality. The function of the Article 5 tribunal is to 
merely apply the established Article 4 status qualification criteria.177 As a result, it is 
intended to be a summary, non-adversarial process. The role of the prisoner’s representative 
in an Article 5 tribunal is therefore not to serve as an advocate for the detainee subjected to 
the status determination, but instead to monitor the proceeding in order to facilitate the 
raising of concerns about the process to the Protecting Power—the entity responsible for 
monitoring compliance with the treaty and bringing alleged violations to the attention of the 
Detaining Power.178 
Beyond the analogous preventive detention consequence of their belligerency, the situation 
of an unprivileged belligerent is fundamentally distinct from that of a POW. Unlike the POW, 
there is no internationally accepted definition of this status, and certainly no treaty-based 
definition.179 In fact, it is unclear whether consensus on such a definition even exists between 
the three branches of the U.S. government. From the inception of the U.S. war on terror 
                                                                                                                               
 177. The Prisoner of War Convention defines the following individuals as POWs: 
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as members of militias or 
volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces. 
(2) Members of other militias and . . . other volunteer corps . . . provided that such 
[organizations] fulfill the [] conditions [of] . . . being commanded by a person responsible for 
his subordinates . . . having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance . . . carrying 
arms openly . . . [and] conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs 
of war. 
(3) Members of regular armed forces [professing] allegiance to a government or an authority 
not recognized by the Detaining Power. 
(4) Persons who accompany the armed forces without actually being members thereof . . . 
provided they have received authorization from the armed forces which they accompany . . . . 
(5) Members of crews . . . of the merchant marine and . . . civil aircraft of the Parties to the 
conflict . . . . 
(6) Inhabitants of non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy spontaneously 
take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having time to form themselves into 
regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect the laws and customs of 
war. 
 GPW, supra note 25, art. 4(A). Two other classifications of individuals are also treated as POWs. See 
id. art. 4(B). 
 178. See id. art. 79, 80 (“[P]risoners’ representatives [are] entrusted with representing [the prisoners they 
represent] before the military authorities, the Protecting Powers, the International Committee of 
the Red Cross and any other organization which may assist them”; “[p]risoners’ representatives 
shall further the physical, spiritual and intellectual well-being of prisoners of war.”). 
 179. See David L. Franklin, Enemy Combatants and the Jurisdictional Fact Doctrine, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1001, 1032–33 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court noted the internationally-accepted 
distinctions between lawful and unlawful combatants in Quirin and recognized spies and saboteurs 
as combatants typically ineligible for POW status, and further considering that the Supreme Court 
in Hamdi “observed that there is disagreement about the appropriate scope of the term ‘enemy 
combatant,’ and noted that ‘the government has never provided any court with the full criteria that 
it uses in classifying individuals as such’ ”) (citations omitted). However, despite the Hamdi Court 
accepting an “as-applied” definition of “enemy combatant” for Hamdi and Congress broadly defining 
“enemy combatant” in the MCA, there has been no international consensus on “the precise boundary 
between combatants and civilians . . . in the present context of terrorism and asymmetrical 
warfare.” Id. 
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preventive detention practice, the definition of who may properly be subjected to preventive 
detention has vexed the government.180 At the outset, the definition adopted by the President 
was similar to the “you know it when you see it” definition of pornography. For individuals 
subjected to detention in the early months of the Global War on Terror, the definition was in 
effect “you know it when President Bush sees it.” The Department of Defense then adopted its 
own definition when it established the CSRT.181 Subsequently, Congress adopted a slightly 
different definition by implication when it defined who could be subjected to trial by military 
commission as the result of being an unlawful enemy combatant.182 In addition to these 
various definitions, the judiciary has developed its own definition for purposes of habeas 
corpus litigation.183 None of these definitions, however, reflect the clarity of the Article 4 
                                                                                                                               
 180. See WITTES, supra note 54, at 16–17. The positions of the Bush and Obama Administrations are 
somewhat different, but arguably the Obama Administration’s decision to cease justifying detention 
authority on inherent Article II powers is, in part, due to the courts’ unwillingness to recognize 
inherent Article II detention powers broader than the powers described by the AUMF: 
The Bush administration asserted that both Article II of the Constitution and the 
September 18, 2001, Authorization for Use of Military Force (“AUMF”) gave it the power to 
detain for the duration of hostilities both members and supporters of entities—including Al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, and “associated forces”—that are engaged in hostilities against the 
United States or its allies. The Supreme Court partially upheld this claim in Hamdi. A 
plurality of the Court determined in that case that the AUMF implicitly conferred the 
“traditional incidents” of lawful warfare on American operations, that these incidents 
included the power to detain enemy fighters in at least some circumstances, and that this 
authority would apply at least to a person who bore arms for the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
This holding obviously left open the question of whether the AUMF (or Article II, for that 
matter) similarly provided for such non-criminal detention of persons captured in other 
circumstances. Less obviously, it also left open a set of difficult issues concerning what it 
means to be a “member” or “part” of any of these organizations, at least some of which are 
better characterized as loose associational networks than as hierarchical organizations. 
. . . In March 2009, however, the Obama administration filed a brief in the Hamlily habeas 
litigation that departed only in three relatively-minor ways from the Bush administration’s 
earlier approach. First, the new administration asserted that henceforth its claim to 
detention authority would rest on the AUMF, rather than on any claim of inherent Article II 
power, and that its AUMF-based authority ought to be construed in accordance with the 
laws of war. Second, the Obama administration dropped the label “enemy combatant” in 
favor of the less provocative practice of referring simply to persons detainable pursuant to 
the AUMF. These moves, notably, have not generated particular controversy among the 
district court judges. Those who have explicitly addressed the source-of-authority issue 
appear to accept that the proper frame of reference is indeed the AUMF. And no judge thus 
far has suggested that the government may have broader authority by virtue of any 
inherent Article II arguments. Nor has any expressed doubt that the AUMF provides at 
least some form of detention authority. 
 Id. (citations omitted). 
 181. See generally CSRT Order, supra note 84 (establishing the procedure of the CSRT hearing and the 
qualifications, roles, and responsibilities of the hearing officers, reporter, and detainee personal 
representative, and outlining the manner in which the detainee could participate in the CSRT 
process). 
 182. See MCA, supra note 64; 10 U.S.C. § 948d (2006). 
 183. See WITTES, supra note 54, at 17–21. As noted in the article, there are up to four distinct judicial 
definitions of detainability, three of which have been espoused by district court judges and one of 
which was presented by the D.C. Court of Appeals. The most widely-accepted detainment position is 
based on Hamlily and, summarized, states that while the “AUMF confers authority on the executive 
branch to detain members of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces . . . independent support—
even if substantial—[cannot] provide a distinct ground for detention.” Id. at 18 (citing Hamlily v. 
Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009)). However, the judge in Hamlily emphasized “that there 
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are ‘no settled criteria’ for identifying formal membership in Al Qaeda” and thus “courts must be 
open to proof of functional membership.” WITTES, supra note 54, at 18 (quoting Hamlily, 616 F. 
Supp. 2d at 75–76). The judge in Hamlily thus noted that “[t]he ‘key inquiry,’ in all events, is 
‘whether the individual functions or participates within or under the command structure of the 
organization—i.e., whether he receives and executes orders or directions.’ ” Id. (quoting Hamlily, 
616 F. Supp. 2d at 75). This position has received the most support among the district judges in the 
D.C. Circuit, but other judges have reinterpreted even this “most widely-accepted” definition. To 
summarize the Hamlily definition and describe a reinterpretation: 
Hamlily . . . precludes detention of entirely-independent actors who happen to provide 
support to Al Qaeda, but it considers acts of support to be relevant evidence of functional 
membership as long as the government can establish an element of direction and control in 
the relationship between the group and the individual. Subsequently, at least four other 
judges—Hogan, Robertson, Kollar-Kotelly, and Lamberth—have expressly adopted this 
interpretation. 
A fifth judge—Urbina—likewise has expressly adopted the Hamlily definition, but his 
actual application of the test suggests that he may have in mind something more restrictive 
than the other judges. In Hatim v. Obama, Judge Ricardo Urbina adopts the Hamlily 
standard but then goes on to address the sufficiency of the government’s attempt to satisfy 
that standard by proving that the detainee had attended Al Qaeda’s Al Farouq training 
camp. In that context, he states that even if the government could prove that the petitioner 
attended that camp and that he understood that he thereby became part of the “al-Qaida 
apparatus,” the government’s burden would still require it to present evidence to the effect 
that he had actually received and executed orders from Al Qaeda and thereby “participated” 
in its command structure, rather than simply received its training. It may be that the other 
judges subscribing to Hamlily would take the same view, but it seems more likely that this 
entails a degree of engagement beyond what most or all of them have in mind under the 
heading of functional membership. 
 Id. at 18–19 (citations omitted) (quoting Hatim v. Obama, 677 F. Supp. 2d 1, 13 (D.D.C. 2009)). The 
second definitional position, from Gherebi, tracks the Administration’s support for the notion that 
“either membership or substantial support can trigger detention authority” but that the authority 
“ ‘encompass[es] only individuals who were members of the enemy organization’s armed forces, as 
that term is intended under the laws of war, at the time of their capture.’ ” Id. at 19 (quoting 
Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43, 70–71 (D.D.C. 2009)). The article notes that “[w]hether this 
approach truly differs from the Hamlily approach depends, of course, on whether one thinks that 
the concept of membership under the laws of war would encompass the ‘functional membership’ 
scenario.” Id. The third position, first expressed in the Boumediene case on remand from the 
Supreme Court, is simply Judge Leon’s express adoption of the Bush Administration’s detainability 
definition, which allows detainment of “both members and supporters of Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and 
associated forces.” Id. at 20 (quoting Boumediene v. Bush, 583 F. Supp. 2d 133 (D.D.C. 2008)). 
However, when presented with the Obama Administration’s more limited definition, Judge Leon 
has yet to “subsequently confront[] a petition that would require him to accept or reject the 
government’s continuing claim of authority to detain on grounds of support alone”; Judge Leon even 
appeared to “express[] some degree of impatience with the effort by the Obama administration to 
narrow modestly the scope of its detention authority.” Id. (quoting Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 
2d 123, 127 (D.D.C. 2009)). Finally, the fourth position, first presented by a 2–1 panel of the D.C. 
Circuit in Al Bihani, “construes the AUMF to support not just the narrower support ground the 
Obama administration favors, but also the original Bush administration variant—in which support 
did not necessarily have to qualify as substantial” in order for the support to justify detention. Id. 
(citing Al Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). While the petitioner argued that an 
interpretation of the AUMF allowing for military commission trials and detainment of persons 
materially supporting hostilities stands in conflict with the detention authority of the law of armed 
conflict, the majority stated that the law of armed conflict was “ ‘not a source of authority for U.S. 
courts’ and cannot be construed ‘as extra-textual limiting principles for the President’s war powers 
under the AUMF.’ ” Id. at 21 (citing Al Bihani, 590 F.3d at 872). 
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POW definition.184 Terms like “materially” or “substantially supported” involve a high degree 
of subjective interpretation, and the scope of detention authority continues to this day to be 
an area of uncertainty. 
This definitional uncertainty undermines the legitimacy of a broad-based analogy to the 
GPW when assessing the extent of procedural protections that should be provided to 
unprivileged belligerent detainees. For these detainees, belligerent status determinations 
involve far more complexity than the determination of prisoner of war status. As noted above, 
the standard pursuant to which they will be detained is less clear than that applicable to 
POWs. This in turn leads to a very different evidentiary equation. For individuals brought 
before an Article 5 tribunal to determine whether they qualify as POWs, the evidentiary focus 
is almost exclusively on indicia of connections to a defined enemy armed force.185 Thus, 
information related to uniform, equipment, and capture in the proximity of clearly identified 
enemy personnel is what provides significant probative value. In contrast, the evidentiary 
focus for determining unprivileged belligerent status is often much more nuanced. 
Information related to associations, activities, and state of mind is normally far more 
significant than uniform or other traditional indicia of belligerent status. As a result, simply 
extending the procedural construct of the GPW—or, and more specifically, of the Article 5 
tribunal—to status determinations that will result in indefinite detention of unprivileged 
enemy belligerents is both unjustified and inefficient. Instead, as reflected by the lessons 
learned in the decade since the United States began detaining individuals based on this 
status, a hybrid process is needed to balance the legitimate interests of preventive detention 
with the equally legitimate liberty interest of individuals improperly swept up in an 
overzealous point of capture detention effort. 
This lesson has recently been manifested in the U.S. revision of the detention review 
process in Parwan, Afghanistan. As a work in progress, this effort has produced a substantial 
improvement in the overall detention operation in Afghanistan. As will be summarized in the 
next section, these revisions established a quasi-adversarial process and recognized the 
importance of providing detainees with representation in that process. However, the 
individuals assigned with this responsibility are not lawyers, but instead lay U.S. military 
officers, calling into question the effectiveness of the overall revision effort. 
                                                                                                                               
 184. See generally GPW, supra note 25, art. 4 (specifically defining categories of persons to be considered 
prisoners of war and thus protected under the Third Geneva Convention). 
 185. An Article 5 hearing under the Third Convention occurs solely to determine whether any of the 
Article 4 definitions apply to the subject of the hearing; if one does not, the subject should not be 
considered a POW and will not be protected by the Third Convention. See GPW, supra note 25, 
art. 4. Note that under Article 5, a detaining Power must presume that and act as if a captured 
belligerent qualifies as a POW protected by the Third Convention unless and until the Article 5 
tribunal finds otherwise (i.e., that the individual does not fit into any Article 4 category). Id. 
(“persons . . . [who] hav[e] committed a belligerent act and hav[e] fallen into the hands of the 
enemy . . . shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status [under 
Article 4] has been determined . . . .”). 
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B. Questioning the Efficacy of Non-Legal Representation 
Referencing Supreme Court right to counsel jurisprudence in no way suggests that the 
authors propose extending that right to unprivileged enemy belligerents. Such a proposal 
would ignore the unquestionable fact that only initiation of formal adversarial criminal 
process triggers that right, a trigger not implicated by preventive wartime detentions and 
unaffected by detainee nationality. Instead, this reference is intended to highlight an 
underlying tenet of this jurisprudence: the indelible link between protecting individuals 
facing the risk of a deprivation of liberty and the lawyer ethos of zealous representation. That 
risk permeates the punitive and preventive detention process, a risk that justifies questioning 
the wisdom of legal representation limited to only one of these contexts. 
Detention hearings, regardless of where they occur, have been criticized by third-party 
human rights groups for allegedly failing to provide true due process to detainees—in effect, 
denying them the ability to effectively challenge their detention. The main criticism stems 
from lack of trained legal representation for the detainees; the criticism is based not only in 
the lack of zealous advocacy, but also lack of trust between PR and detainee and the very 
limited training given to PRs resulting, to an extent, of PR ignorance or impotence in knowing 
how to truly assist the detainee.186 Because of these and other factors, several detainees have 
criticized their PRs for providing what they perceived to be little or no assistance,187 and 
                                                                                                                               
 186. DAPHNE EVIATAR, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, DETAINED AND DENIED IN AFGHANISTAN: HOW TO MAKE 
U.S. DETENTION COMPLY WITH THE LAW 13 (Gabor Rona et al. eds., 2011) [hereinafter “DETAINED 
AND DENIED”]. In one portion of its report criticizing DRBs, Human Rights First emphasized that 
[a]ccess to legal representatives, who prioritize client representation and are trained and 
encouraged to assess and respond to factual assertions and allegations of wrongdoing, are 
necessary for a legitimate, fair, and accurate detainee review process . . . [because 
appointment as a PR does not require an officer to learn the local language or undergo 
linguistic or cultural training,] the detainee has little reason to trust the representative. 
Many of the former detainees we interviewed, all of whom had experienced a DRB, told us 
that they did not trust the P.R.—who to them appeared as simply another uniformed 
American soldier—to truly represent their interests. 
 Id. Further, stark contrasts were drawn between PRs, who (at the time) owed no duty at all to their 
detainee, and lawyers, who “have an obligation to respect the interests of their clients and ensure 
their clients’ confidentiality.” Id. 
 187. See id. at 13–16. One detainee, J.I. from Khost Province, reflected on his experience with a DRB 
hearing: “[the Board was] not answering my questions about where is the evidence in court. The 
Personal Representative just sat, he did not talk. He didn’t do anything.” Id. at 13. Similar 
comments were made by Gul Alai, who allegedly “owned a compound where IED-making material 
was found.” Id. at 14. In his DRB, Gul Alai stated that he did not own the entire compound he was 
captured in (and within such compound, a house was found to contain IED materials), that he 
simply owned a house which contained no bomb-making materials. Id. The DB presented no 
evidence of who owned the entire compound or the house that contained IED materials, and Gul 
Alai’s PR neither “demand[ed] that such evidence be presented, nor did he present any evidence 
himself . . . [the PR asked only if] the detainee knew his neighbors and could see over their wall, and 
how he had been treated by the U.S. military” and presented no evidence or other statements during 
the hearing’s unclassified portion. Id. Another detainee, Nasrullah, was detained after weapons 
were found near the area where he lived, though he tested negative for explosive residue. Id. at 14–
15. No evidence was produced of who owned the house that contained the discovered weapons “or 
any forensic evidence that might indicate how long the weapons had been buried there . . . [or] how 
long the detainee had lived in the house,” and Nasrullah’s PR simply “asked the detainee whether 
he owned any weapons . . . [or] knew the other people arrested with him.” Id. at 15. In a third case, 
the detainee, who wished to remain anonymous in the report, was accused of planting IEDs along 
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human rights organizations criticize the United States for not providing counsel despite no 
international law requirement to do so.188 
With regard to lay representation, the roles of personal representatives before a CSRT 
(convened for detainees at Guantanamo) and personal representatives before a DRB 
(convened for detainees at Bagram-Parwan) are largely identical. In both CSRTs and DRBs, 
at any session that the detainee is not permitted to be present (for example, a classified 
portion of the Board), his PR would nevertheless be allowed to attend.189 The role of the PR in 
                                                                                                                               
the side of the road, and “coalition forces found a weapons cache.” Id. After being detained nearby, 
the detainee denied planting IEDs, and the PR presented no evidence and asked no questions of the 
detainee regarding being tested for explosive residue and if he handled any of the discovered 
weapons. “Instead, the P.R. asked questions such as: What did you grow on your farm? What did 
you study in school? Did you have religious studies there?” Id. From interviewing detainees, the 
report notes that the interaction between the detainee and the PR, both before and during the DRB, 
generally went as follows: 
In each case, the detainee said that the P.R. met with him once or twice before the hearing, 
but did not present any witnesses or evidence pertaining to the relevant facts or the charges 
alleged. In no case did the P.R. challenge evidence presented by the Recorder, or question 
live witnesses. At most, in some cases the P.R. arranged for family members or village elders 
to attend the DRB and act as a character witness for the detainee . . . Although the P.R. 
sometimes asked questions, it was often unclear to what end, other than to give the detainee 
an opportunity to say that he would not support the Taliban in the future and would not 
speak badly to his neighbors about Coalition forces. 
 Id. at 16. Frequently, release from detention followed family member or elder testimony on behalf of 
the detainee, not any presentation of hard exculpatory evidence. See id. at 17–18 (noting that 
detainee M.T. was released after family members testified for him; detainee M.G. was released after 
relatives testified at his second DRB; detainee J.I. was released shortly after the judge in his case 
spoke to the detainee’s family members via telephone). 
 188. See id. at 13; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 6 I.L.M. 368, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. The ICCPR provides that “[a]nyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or 
detention shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide 
without delay on the lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.” 
Id. art. 9 § 4. However, the United States entered five reservations, five understandings, and four 
declarations when it ratified the ICCPR in 1992. Significantly, the Senate declared that Articles 1–
27 of the ICCPR were not self-executing, meaning that the United States Congress would need to 
enact domestic laws enabling the United States to fulfill its obligations under the treaty. See 138 
CONG. REC. S4781-01 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992). See also Body of Principles for the Protection of All 
Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 
(Dec. 9, 1988) (providing rights for arrested detained persons). Specifically in the detention context, 
the Body of Principles states that “A detained person shall have the right to defend himself or to be 
assisted by counsel as prescribed by law.” Id. at Annex, princ. 11, ¶ 1. Additionally, 
A detained person shall be entitled to have the assistance of a legal counsel. He shall be 
informed of his right by the competent authority promptly after arrest and shall be provided 
with reasonable facilities for exercising it. 
If a detained person does not have a legal counsel of his own choice, he shall be entitled to 
have a legal counsel assigned to him by a judicial or other authority in all cases where the 
interests of justice so require and without payment by him if he does not have sufficient 
means to pay. 
 Id. princ. 17 (paragraph numbering omitted). However, the Body of Principles does not “explicitly 
provide for a right to counsel in administrative detention (as opposed to pre-trial criminal 
detention).” DETAINED AND DENIED, supra note 186, at 13. 
 189. The role of the PR at the DRB is to “help[] prepare the detainee for his testimony before the board, 
both the direct testimony and responses to anticipated questions from the board members and 
recorder” and “remain[] a bifurcated hearing consisting of an unclassified session, where the 
detainee is present, and an classified portion, where the detainee is excluded but his personal 
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each hearing is to “assist” the detainee in preparing for the hearing, but a major change has 
occurred recently vis-à-vis the amount of “privilege” with which the PR must treat 
information told to him by the detainee: the PR in the DRB context now has some affirmative 
duty to the detainee that more closely resembles the duties which a lawyer owes to his 
client.190 
The Supreme Court’s right to counsel cases reveal two important principles: First, 
lawyers, by virtue of their ethical obligation and professional culture, possess a unique 
capacity to zealously represent even the most reviled objects of societal scorn; second, 
bringing that zealousness to bear is essential to protect the interests of individuals subjected 
to confinement.191 While our legal culture normally associates such confinement with the 
criminal process, recent decisions of the Court have extended the requirement of zealous legal 
                                                                                                                               
representative remains to hear, present, and challenge information on the detainee’s behalf.” 
Bovarnick, supra note 100, at 32–34; cf. JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22173, 
DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY 3 (last updated July 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22173.pdf (describing the role of the PR at the CSRT and 
stating that while the PR “may view classified information and comment on it to the tribunal to aid 
in its determination . . . [the PR] does not act as an advocate for the detainee”). 
 190. See Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss Amended Petitions for Writs of Habeas Corpus at 22–23, Al 
Maqaleh v. Gates, 620 F. Supp. 2d 51 (No. 06-cv-01669), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/64-main.pdf. In its motion, the 
Government draws a clear distinction between the “loyalty” PRs owe their detainees at CSRTs as 
opposed to those at DRBs: 
Whereas the CSRT personal representative had no confidential relationship with the 
detainee and there was no requirement that he act and advocate for the detainee, the DRB 
personal representative is bound by a non-disclosure policy, which prohibits him from 
disclosing information “detrimental to the detainee’s case that was obtained through 
communications with the detainee” as well as “adverse information discovered by the 
personal representative’s independent investigatory efforts.” 
 Id. (citations omitted). See also Memorandum from Robert S. Harward, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, to 
U.S. Military Forces Conducting Detention Operations in Afghanistan, on Detainee Review Board 
Policy 5 (July 11, 2010) (“The personal representative shall act and advocate in the best interests of 
the detainee.”), available at http://www.politico.com/static/PPM205_bagrambrfb.html. 
 191. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). The Supreme Court discussed how the opportunity for a 
defendant o be heard is meaningless without the opportunity to be represented by a person trained 
in the law, and that such a denial amounts to a denial of constitutionally-mandated due process: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the 
right to be heard by counsel. Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of 
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the 
rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper 
charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or 
otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his 
defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every 
step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger 
of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men 
of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble 
intellect. If in any case, civil of criminal, a state or federal court were arbitrarily to refuse to 
hear a party by counsel, employed by and appearing for him, it reasonably may not be 
doubted that such a refusal would be a denial of a hearing, and, therefore, of due process in 
the constitutional sense. 
 Id. at 68–69. 
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representation beyond that context to situations of preventive non-punitive detention and 
immigration removal proceedings.192 
These two vectors—a limited trigger for the right to counsel and the significance of liberty 
interest implicated by any form of confinement—create a gray area for any meaningful 
analysis of the protections that should be afforded to individuals subject to wartime 
preventive detention as unprivileged belligerents. Wartime captives have not historically 
been provided legal representation in the detention determination process. Instead, as noted 
earlier in this Article, assistance has traditionally come in the form of a layman prisoner’s 
representative. This history arguably supports the practice of providing lay representation for 
detainees. However, the consequence of the status determination made by the review 
tribunals established to assess detainability of alleged unprivileged belligerents clearly 
implicates the same concerns implicated by the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the 
extension of that right to the non-punitive detention processes the Supreme Court has 
recently endorsed. In fact, the consequence of a wartime detention decision is potentially 
more profound than that related to punitive incarceration.193 Unlike the criminal context, the 
detention of unprivileged belligerents is not for a defined period, but is as close to indefinite 
detention as in any other imaginable context.194 
It is clear that this perceived consequence of indefinite detention was a significant 
motivation for the important and credible revisions to the detention review process 
implemented to date. It is equally clear that Congress has recognized the importance of legal 
representation for individuals subjected to this process. Collectively, these developments 
confirm that individual representation is an important component in mitigating the risk of 
erroneous status determinations, thereby increasing the probability of factually justified 
detention decisions. What is less clear is whether the consequence of relying on non-lawyers 
to provide this representation has been adequately assessed or critiqued.195 Ultimately, the 
                                                                                                                               
 192. See, e.g., United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 742, 751–52 (1987) (holding constitutional the 1984 
Bail Reform Act’s provisions regarding pretrial preventive detention, in part because of the Act’s 
procedural safeguards, including a right to counsel at the administrative detention hearing); United 
States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) (holding constitutional the Adam Walsh Child 
Protection and Safety Act, which in part authorizes a federal district court to order the civil 
commitment of a mentally ill and sexually-dangerous federal prisoner beyond the date the prisoner 
would otherwise be released from incarceration; the statute provides that at the commitment 
hearing, the prisoner “shall be represented by counsel.”); Compean, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (BIA 2009) 
(stating that the Board of Immigration Appeals has discretion to reopen removal proceedings “to 
consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on conduct of counsel,” even when allegedly 
ineffective conduct of counsel “occurred after a final order of removal had been entered”). 
 193. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (discussing the process due under a CSRT and 
stating that “[a]lthough we make no judgment whether the CSRTs, as currently constituted, satisfy 
due process standards, we agree . . . that, even when all the parties involved in this process act with 
diligence and in good faith, there is considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s findings of fact”). 
 194. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (“If the Government does not consider this 
unconventional war won for two generations, and if it maintains during that time that Hamdi 
might, if released, rejoin forces fighting against the United States, then the position it has taken 
throughout the litigation of this case suggests that Hamdi’s detention could last for the rest of his 
life.”). 
 195. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767, 787 (noting that a detainee’s personal representative is not a 
lawyer and explicitly not even a lay advocate, and while discussing how General Yamashita and the 
defendants in Quirin were provided with legal representation, also stating that those proceedings 
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shift away from the lay representative model reflected in the NDAA 2012 implicates 
potentially significant cost/benefit considerations. It is to these considerations the Article will 
now turn. 
C. The Potential Benefits of Legal Representation 
Lawyers play a unique role in any adversarial or quasi-adversarial process. In many ways, 
that role mirrors the role of the soldier on the field of battle. Both the soldier and the lawyer 
are inculcated with an ethos of aggressive execution of the mission. For the soldier, this is 
reflected in the values of duty and selfless service. For the lawyer, it is reflected in the ethical 
duty of zealousness. Irrespective of the label placed on the duty, the effect is the same. Both 
the soldier and the lawyer perform their duties on behalf of a “client;” both the soldier and the 
lawyer are expected to execute their duties tirelessly and aggressively within the limits of the 
rules that regulate their respective battles; and both the soldier and the lawyer understand 
that it is not their role to question the mission assigned by the client, but instead to fight 
within the limits of the rules to accomplish that mission.196 
This last aspect of the analogy between the soldier and the lawyer is perhaps most 
significant to truly understand the importance of the zealous representation ethos. Lawyers 
possess a unique ability to embrace their duty on behalf of the most vilified objects of state 
action.197 Exemplified by the likes of John Adams,198 Sam Leibowitz,199 and Kenneth 
Royall,200 this ability is central to the credibility of the adversarial process. The defense bar 
                                                                                                                               
were adversarial in nature, where Boumediene’s CSRT was considered an administrative 
proceeding, not an adversarial proceeding). 
 196. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (1983). Rule 1.2 concerns the scope of representation 
and demarcates the sharing of authority between the attorney and client: 
[A] lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation 
and . . . shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A 
lawyer may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out 
the representation. A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter. In 
a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client’s decision, after consultation with the 
lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will 
testify. 
 Id. at 1.2(a). A common axiom is that the client makes strategic decisions (e.g., what plea to enter) 
while the lawyer makes tactical decisions (e.g., determining the order of witnesses called, deciding 
what evidence to offer). However, this is not entirely accurate, as the lawyer’s tactical decision 
making is tempered by the client’s overall strategic control (e.g., the client may tell the lawyer not to 
call a certain witness or not to offer certain evidence; the lawyer must abide by these decisions). 
 197. This acceptance of duty is sometimes codified into rules of professional conduct, perhaps in part to 
remind lawyers that no matter their personal disagreements with their clients’ lifestyles, that 
everyone is entitled to zealous representation. See, e.g., AIR FORCE RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
1.2(b) (2005), available at http://www.caaflog.com/wp-
content/uploads/AirForceRulesofProfessionalConduct.pdf (“A lawyer’s representation of a client, 
including representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s 
economic, social, or moral views or activities.”). 
 198. See Adams’s Defense Speech, supra note 129. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Kenneth Claiborne Royall was a colonel in the United States Army during World War II. In 1942, 
he was appointed by President Roosevelt to defend the Nazis captured during Operation 
Pastorius—also known as the defendants in Ex parte Quirin. Though Royall was ordered to defend 
the Nazis before a military tribunal, he believed that the President did not have the authority to 
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prides itself on its unapologetic commitment to individuals who although legally presumed 
innocent are often obviously factually guilty. Accepting the approbation of the public—a 
public that is often incapable of truly understanding either the nature of the lawyer’s duty or 
its contribution to legitimacy—is an integral part of their obligation. Lawyers understand 
that without that zealous commitment to the client, the adversarial system cannot properly 
function, and as the Supreme Court reminds us periodically, the distortion produced by an 
absence of such representation fundamentally undermines the entire concept of justice.201 
Ensuring a balanced adversarial process that produces a credible result therefore requires 
more than merely competing representatives; it requires representatives fully committed to 
the adversarial competition. The assumption that lay representatives are capable of such 
commitment is highly questionable in the abstract, and even more so in the context of a 
review process charged with determining whether to release an individual alleged to be an 
enemy belligerent. In the abstract, asking a layperson to embrace the cause of target of state 
accusation—even in relation to a non-punitive allegation—is inconsistent with the normal 
assumption that accusation suggests guilt.202 In the detainee status context, the difficulty is 
exponentially increased. 
                                                                                                                               
convene a secret military court to try his clients, and appealed to the federal courts, arguing that the 
military commission was unconstitutional. Royall represented the defendants at the Supreme 
Court, and though the Court held in favor of the President’s order, he had succeeded in obtaining 
independent civilian judicial review for his clients. Royall later served as the last Secretary of War 
in 1947, and then as the first Secretary of the Army until 1949. See Nathan Williams, What 
Happened to the 8 Germans Tried by a Military Court in World War II, HISTORY NEWS NETWORK 
(July 8, 2002), http://hnn.us/articles/431.html; Kenneth Claiborne Royall, U.S. ARMY CENTER OF 
MILITARY HISTORY, http://www.history.army.mil/books/Sw-SA/Royall.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 
2012). See also Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 201. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684–86 (1984) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel exists, and is needed, in order to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial. . . . [T]he Court 
has recognized that ‘the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ ”) 
(citations omitted). In its jurisprudence, the Court has enumerated the requirements for a fair trial 
and repeatedly emphasized that, with regard to the right to counsel, 
a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an 
impartial tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding. The right to 
counsel plays a crucial role in the adversarial system embodied in the Sixth Amendment, 
since access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the “ample 
opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution” to which they are entitled. 
 Id. at 685. 
 202. That this assumption is normal is reflected in the universal admonition to jurors in criminal cases 
that they may not consider the accusation of a defendant as evidence of guilt. See Carter v. 
Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 289 (1981) (holding that the trial court’s refusal to instruct the jury that 
“[t]he defendant is not compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an 
inference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way” was fundamental error and that a 
defendant had a right to such an instruction under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments). The 
Court noted that while “[n]o judge can prevent jurors from speculating about why a defendant 
stands mute in the face of a criminal accusation,” a judge must, at the defendant’s request, “use the 
unique power of the jury instruction to reduce that speculation to a minimum” and that “the failure 
to limit the jurors’ speculation on the meaning of . . . [a defendant’s] silence, when the defendant 
makes a timely request that a prophylactic instruction be given, exacts an impermissible toll on the 
full and free exercise of the privilege [against self-incrimination].” Id. at 303–05 (alteration in 
original). 
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Zealous representation of detainees by lay military officers requires commitment to the 
protection of the interests of an alleged enemy operative. This in itself is problematic. How 
can a member of the U.S. armed forces be expected to embrace the interests of an individual 
captured by his colleagues and detained based on an initial determination of belligerent 
conduct?203 It is difficult to imagine a more unattractive “client.” Exacerbating this problem 
are the obvious stakes implicated by the outcome of the review process. Drawing stark 
distinctions between representation by counsel and representation by personal 
representative, a report conducted on the role of the personal representative at CSRT 
proceedings revealed that, on numerous occasions, PRs did very little in the hearing to help 
their assigned detainee and some PRs actively advocated against their detainee and for the 
Government.204 At the same time, it is entirely unrealistic to expect the representative to 
ignore the possibility that effectively performing the representation duties could result in an 
enemy operative being returned to the battle-space. The obvious consequence of such an 
outcome would include the death or injury of other members of U.S. or coalition armed forces. 
It is far more realistic to assume that these considerations will inevitably compromise the 
representative zeal essential to effectuate the purpose of the quasi-adversarial process. 
It is unlikely that the Department of Defense was ignorant to this risk when it developed 
the detainee review process for both Guantanamo and Parwan. Instead, it is far more likely 
that the decision to rely on lay representatives was based on three primary considerations. 
First, an analogy to the GPW Article 5 process almost certainly influenced this decision. As 
noted earlier, on the surface the objective of both the CSRTs and the Article 5 process are 
analogous. Accordingly, it is somewhat logical that those responsible for developing the CSRT 
process would adopt the Article 5 model. However, as it was also explained earlier, because 
the analogy between the POW and the unprivileged belligerent is limited, this assumption 
cannot justify a wholesale importation of Article 5 process for the unlawful belligerent 
detention determination. 
                                                                                                                               
 203. See David J.R. Frakt, The Myth of Divided Loyalties: Defending Detainees and the Constitution in 
the Guantanamo Military Commissions, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 545, 554 (2011) (“Contrary to 
what some non-lawyers might believe, there is no conflict of interest for a military lawyer in 
representing an individual whose interests may be, in some sense, adverse to the U.S. government 
or the U.S. military, at least as defined by the rules of professional responsibility.”). Obviously, legal 
training emphasizes the nature of zealous representation, even of a client one might find personally 
abhorrent; unfortunately, lay representatives are not steeped in the sort of training and ethos as 
lawyers are, potentially resulting in the internal conflict described above. 
 204. See MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA DENBEAUX, NO-HEARING HEARINGS—CSRT: THE MODERN HABEAS 
CORPUS? AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE GOVERNMENT’S COMBATANT STATUS REVIEW 
TRIBUNALS AT GUANTÁNAMO 3, 4–6 (2006), available at 
http://law.shu.edu/publications/guantanamoReports/final_no_hearing_hearings_report.pdf. The 
report notes that in CSRT proceedings, 
[t]he detainee’s personal representative was totally silent in 12% of the hearings, and in only 
52% of the hearings did the personal representative make substantive comments. However, 
sometimes the substantive comments of the personal representative advocated for the 
Government and against the detainee. At the end of the hearing, the personal 
representative had a last opportunity to make comments, but 98% of the time the personal 
representative explicitly chose not to do so. 
 Id. at 6. See also supra note 188 (describing the comments of a number of Bagram detainees 
regarding the efficacy of their PRs during DRB hearings). 
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Second, it is likely that reliance on lay representatives was based in part on the 
assumption that tactical and technical proficiency is the sine qua non of effective 
representation. This assumption is supported by the efforts devoted to training these 
representatives.205 This is a flawed assumption. Effective representation of individuals 
accused of conduct so contrary to the interests of the state that it warrants incarceration—
either punitive or preventive—requires more than tactical or technical proficiency in the 
process established to make the detention determination. The true sine qua non is the far 
more intangible element of zealousness. As noted earlier, this clearly forms the foundation of 
the Supreme Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence, and is central to the ethical obligation of 
lawyers. To suggest that expertise in the process alone renders representation of such an 
individual truly effective is inconsistent with the American tradition of representation.206 
Of course, it is virtually impossible to prove this premise with anything close to empirical 
certitude. However, several considerations provide inferential support. First, consider the 
analogy to the soldier. Like the lawyer, tactical and technical proficiency are essential to the 
soldier’s effectiveness. However, military leaders intuitively understand that this is not the 
key element in producing a truly effective soldier. A truly effective soldier is an individual 
who has been transformed from “civilian” into “soldier.” This transformation involves far 
more than the development of tactical and technical proficiency; it involves inculcating the 
recruit with the warrior ethos and the value set that defines military service. This is a major 
component not only of initial training, but also of a soldier’s entire professional development. 
This is what accounts for the transformation from individual to member of a team committed 
to mission accomplishment. Soldiers are immersed in a culture of duty, loyalty, selfless 
service, and a sense of pride in being part of an organization that places mission 
accomplishment above self-interest.207 Without that intangible element, the transformation is 
fundamentally incomplete. 
This analogy is indeed ironic in the context of the detainee representation process. The 
Department of Defense has essentially adopted an approach to this process that is 
inconsistent with its own understanding of the relationship between tactical and technical 
                                                                                                                               
 205. See Bovarnick, supra note 100, at 20 n.82, 30 (discussing the initial training and periodic refresher 
training requirements of board members, recorders, and personal representatives). 
 206. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685 (discussing the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and holding that 
“a fair trial is one in which evidence subject to adversarial testing is presented to an impartial 
tribunal for resolution of issues defined in advance of the proceeding”). Further, the Court reinforced 
the notion that access to legal representation “plays a crucial role in the adversarial system 
embodied in the Sixth Amendment, since access to counsel’s skill and knowledge is necessary to 
accord defendants the ‘ample opportunity to meet the case of the prosecution’ to which they are 
entitled.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 207. Each service branch’s culture is reflected in its core values. While each phrases its values slightly 
differently, the U.S. Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps all list some form of honor, integrity, 
selfless service, courage, and commitment to excellence as core values. See, e.g., Living the Army 
Values, U.S. ARMY, http://www.goarmy.com/soldier-life/being-a-soldier/living-the-army-values.html 
(last visited Nov. 23, 2012); Honor, Courage, Commitment, U.S. NAVY, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/navy_legacy_hr.asp?id=193 (last reviewed Aug. 12, 2009); Core 
Values, U.S. MARINES, 
http://www.marines.com/main/index/making_marines/culture/traditions/core_values (last visited 
Nov. 23, 2012). 
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proficiency and professional ethos. Taking the analogy to its logical conclusion, relying on lay 
advocates to represent suspected unprivileged enemy belligerents in the detention review 
process is analogous to relying on an experienced hunter to perform the mission of an 
infantryman on the field of battle. Such a suggestion is of course ludicrous. However, it 
reveals the significance of professional ethos in relation to the warrior’s execution of the 
challenging duty entrusted to him. In the adversarial system, it is the advocate who serves as 
the warrior, and in that system, the significance of professional ethos is no less profound. 
The third consideration that likely contributed to the lay representative approach is 
feasibility. A simplistic assessment of the cost-benefit equation might suggest that providing 
lay representation for suspected unlawful enemy belligerents is logical. The numbers and 
availability of non-legal military officers capable of being trained in representation duties is 
inherently more extensive than the narrower sub-set of available military legal officers.  
Judge Advocates are also a finite resource already involved in the support of military 
operations in unprecedented numbers. Providing a military lawyer for every captive facing an 
indefinite detention hearing would create an additional burden on this finite pool of military 
lawyers. If the focal point of satisfying the representation requirement is technical aptitude, 
then the availability of an alternate source of officers to perform these duties would seem an 
attractive and logical alternative. 
Even assuming arguendo that technical competence is the appropriate focal point of 
cost/benefit analysis (an assumption challenged throughout this Article) there are three 
additional considerations that undermine the continuation of the lay representative 
approach. First, the second order benefit to the habeas litigation process. Second, the overall 
enhanced credibility of the U.S. detention process. Third, enhanced efficiency in the process to 
determine who should continue to be detained. Each of these considerations favor 
representation by individuals imbued with the legal professional ethos. This conclusion is 
based on the assumption that legal representation would improve the quality of the detention 
review process by producing more comprehensive review tribunal records and mitigating the 
risk of detaining individuals without legitimate cause, a conclusion that apparently motivated 
Congress to impose this requirement on the Department of Defense.208 
                                                                                                                               
 208. Legal counsel would be able to note the flaws of the CSRT process, and move to challenge them, just 
as appointed-JAG defense attorneys pointed out flaws with the 2006 MCA military commission 
trials. See Frakt, supra note 203, at 563 (“The efforts of both military defense counsel and 
prosecutors highlighted the many flaws of the MCA of 2006. This, in turn, led to dramatic 
improvements in the MCA of 2009.”). Frakt, himself a Lieutenant Colonel in the U.S. Air Force 
Reserve JAG Corps, also notes that in his experience, JAG attorneys do not feel as if representing 
detainees is harming their country; rather, many see it as a way to defend the Constitution and 
American values: 
The ultimate allegiance of the military lawyer is to the U.S. Constitution. Military defenders 
not only saw no conflict with their oath to defend the Constitution, but viewed the 
representation of detainees as being in total harmony with this duty. Military lawyers are 
also deeply committed to the laws of war and the rule of law generally. The substantive law 
of the military commission, as well as the rules and procedures developed by the Pentagon, 
were inconsistent with the laws of war and violated basic principles of due process. Many 
JAGs viewed the entire legal regime as an affront to military justice and to basic American 
values and were eager to reveal its shortcomings. 
 Id. at 558. 
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The first of these considerations—the impact on the habeas litigation process—could 
produce two important benefits. First, it is logical to assume that representation by a skilled 
lawyer will enhance the review tribunal quasi-adversarial process. Improvements might 
include exposing evidentiary deficiencies, identifying and presenting otherwise overlooked 
probative evidence, subjecting presented evidence to more robust testing, and more effectively 
summarizing the evidence and legal standards applicable to the decision-maker. This 
enhancement will result in a more comprehensive record of the status determination process. 
If and when these determinations are subject to federal judicial review, the enhanced quality 
of these records should logically result in enhanced reliance on the detainability 
determination by reviewing courts.209 The importance of this potential benefit is highlighted 
by the government’s habeas litigation track record. After Boumediene opened the door to 
consideration of evidentiary insufficiency, the review process became a major focal point of 
reviewing courts.210 Improved representation should mitigate this problem. Of course, the 
value of this benefit is now restricted to the Guantanamo CSRTs. Whether habeas review will 
ultimately be extended to other detention venues, like Afghanistan, is yet to be determined 
conclusively.211 This improved process could, however, reduce the risk of such extension in 
                                                                                                                               
 209. See id. at 555 (noting that CSRT findings “were largely discounted by defense attorneys . . . [as] [t]he 
Tribunals were viewed as unfair and deeply flawed”); Parhat v. Gates, 532 F.3d 834, 850 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (rejecting the Government’s contention that “it can prevail by submitting documents that read 
as if they were indictments or civil complaints, and that simply assert as facts the elements required 
to prove that a detainee falls within the definition of enemy combatant” and requiring the 
government to demonstrate the reliability of its evidence). 
 210. See WITTES, supra note 54, at 77–80. Two of the major evidentiary issues are hearsay and so-called 
“mosaic evidence”—primarily circumstantial evidence that the Government claims should be 
considered as a whole, as opposed to judicial consideration of each individual piece of evidence by 
itself. With regard to hearsay: 
[b]oth government and habeas counsel are also pushing the appeals courts to redirect the 
lower court concerning the use of hearsay evidence, with a particular focus on the 
admissibility of and weight to be accorded such evidence . . . In Al Adahi, the government 
argues that Judge Kessler flyspecked its evidence way too closely, looking at each piece of 
evidence individually and applying scrutiny to it that, “far from acknowledging the realities 
of the wartime military setting and the weight and sensitivity of the government’s 
interests. . . [applied a] heightened standard of proof for the government.” In one instance, 
the government argues, Judge Kessler “searched for reasons, including mistaken reasons, to 
discredit the government’s witness, and refused on legally erroneous grounds to even 
consider the evidence that corroborated the witness’s statements.” The proper approach, it 
urges the D.C. Circuit, “is to recognize the distinct nature of the intelligence information and 
other sources on which the military must rely, and to accord appropriate deference to the 
inferences that expert military personnel draw from such material based on the insights 
they derive from their military operations and experience. 
 Id. at 77 (citations omitted). 
 211. Although the District of Columbia’s District Court extended habeas review to a detainee held in 
Bagram who had been initially captured outside of Afghanistan, this decision was subsequently 
reversed by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioners’ writs of habeas corpus, as 
petitioners were held outside the de jure sovereignty of the United States and thus previous 
statutory invocations of the Article I, Section 9 Suspension Clause served to deny the district court 
jurisdiction over petitioners’ habeas petitions). This indicates that it is unlikely the courts will 
extend habeas review beyond the limits of Guantanamo detainees. However, as with so many other 
issues related to detentions of unprivileged belligerents in the war on terror, it is truly impossible to 
predict how this issue will ultimately evolve. 
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the future by providing important indicia of credibility to the existing approach to assessing 
detainability. 
Even assuming habeas review is never extended beyond Guantanamo detainees, 
improving the quality of other detention review proceedings will enhance the credibility of the 
overall detention process for unprivileged belligerents. Although the primary focal point of 
criticism of the U.S. detention practices since September 11th has been maltreatment of 
detainees (an issue that arose early in the war on terror and is now widely considered moot as 
the United States has recognized a universal humane treatment obligation for all detainees), 
an important underlying criticism has always been the prima facie illegitimacy of detention 
outside the framework of the Geneva Prisoner of War and Civilian Conventions.212 While 
                                                                                                                               
 212. See, e.g., Jules Lobel, Preventive Detention: Prisoners, Suspected Terrorists and Permanent 
Emergency, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 389, 389 (2003). Lobel argues that detaining against future 
conduct rather than punishing past offenses “threatens to undermine fundamental principles of 
both constitutional law and international law which prohibit certain government action based on 
mere suspicion or perceived threat” and is especially concerned about such detention being 
employed against U.S. citizens, and draws strong historical parallels when arguing that 
[t]he use of indefinite administrative detention against citizens for security purposes 
represents a profound shift in our constitutional order which generally prohibits detaining 
people for [a] substantial period without charging them with a crime. Despite the 
Constitution’s proscriptions, the American government has responded to perceived or 
contrived security threats in the past by detaining or authorizing the detention of disfavored 
groups: anarchist aliens during the Palmer Raids after WWI, Japanese Americans during 
WWII, suspected communists during the Cold War, and now suspected terrorists labeled as 
“enemy combatants.” 
 Id. at 397–98. See also Alec Walen, Criminalizing Statements of Terrorist Intent: How to Understand 
the Law Governing Terrorist Threats, and Why It Should Be Used Instead of Long-Term Preventive 
Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 803, 810–11 (2011). Walen adopts a moral or principled 
approach, rather than a pragmatic approach, to the issue of long-term detention, asserting that 
One might respond to the claim that the government can prosecute suspected terrorists 
(STs) who threaten to commit terrorist acts by saying that that option, helpful as it might 
be, is not as helpful as also having the option of subjecting STs to long-term preventive 
detention (LTPD). I have argued at length against that position, and in favor of the view 
that respect for the dignity of autonomous individuals requires the government to release 
and police, after (at most) a short period of preventive detention, its own citizens who it 
cannot convict of a crime for which long-term punitive detention is a fitting punishment. 
 Id. at 810 (footnote omitted). Walen’s position revolves around the dichotomy of short-term 
detention and observation followed by prosecution or release and further observation, and in all 
instances, long-term detention is inappropriate unless and until the suspect is actually convicted of 
a crime. Walen makes stark distinctions between what he considers to be justifiable short-term 
detention (which, if applied against a citizen may arguably still violate his or her constitutional right 
to liberty) and long-term detention, which is only justifiable in a punitive context or very specific 
preventive contexts. However, at no time does he believe that long-term preventive detention for 
alleged terrorist operatives is appropriate for future intelligence-gathering purposes: 
Those who can be detained fall into two basic categories: those subject to punitive detention 
and those subject to preventive detention. Punitive detention respects autonomy because it 
is based on a person’s autonomous choice to commit a crime. Those subject to preventive 
detention can be detained in the short-term for the sake of security because even innocent 
people can be expected to make small sacrifices for the sake of the greater welfare. People 
may be subject to long-term preventive detention (“LTPD”), however, only if they fall into 
one of four categories: (1) they lack the normal autonomous capacity to govern their own 
choices; (2) they have, in virtue of one or more criminal convictions, lost their right to be 
treated as autonomous and accountable; (3) they have an independent duty to avoid contact 
with others because such contact would be impermissibly harmful (e.g., those with 
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contagious and deadly diseases), and LTPD simply reinforces this duty; or (4) they are 
incapable of being adequately policed and held accountable for their choices. Importantly, 
traditional combatants and some suspected members of groups like al-Qaeda fall under this 
last category, and thus their detention can be accounted for in this AR Model. If, however, a 
given suspected member of a group like al-Qaeda—a suspected terrorist (“ST”)—does not fall 
under this last category (or any of the former three categories), then he must be released 
and policed like any criminal defendant who is acquitted at trial if he is not tried and 
convicted of a crime. 
 Alec Walen, Transcending, but Not Abandoning, the Combatant-Civilian Distinction: A Case Study, 
63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1149, 1163–64 (2011) [hereinafter The Combatant-Civilian Distinction]. In 
considering his point, Walen discusses the al-Marri case in which the Fourth Circuit’s holding was 
ultimately vacated as moot. Al-Marri, a Qatari citizen arrested in December 2001 in connection to 
the 9/11 attacks, was criminally charged with possessing fraudulent credit card numbers in 2002 
and with making false statements to the FBI in 2003. Pleading not guilty, al-Marri was set for trial 
until President Bush determined that al-Marri was an enemy combatant associated with al-Qaeda 
and was transferred to military detention in South Carolina. Al-Marri v. Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 
(2009), vacating as moot al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008). Al-Marri filed for 
habeas relief and while the Fourth Circuit held that he could be detained as an enemy combatant, it 
also held that he had not been provided with sufficient process to challenge that determination. The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari, but vacated the Fourth Circuit’s decision when the Government 
opted to release al-Marri from military detention and prosecute him in federal district court. Al-
Marri, 555 U.S. at 1220. Walen laments the Government’s dismissal, because the Court had never 
addressed a citizen or legal resident alien being arrested and detained on U.S. soil, far from any 
battlefield: 
The Court had already determined, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, that U.S. citizens can be held as 
enemy combatants. But that case based its holding at least in part on the assumption (to be 
verified by a fair hearing) that Hamdi was captured while fighting with the Taliban in what 
was a traditional international armed conflict, a conflict in which the United States was and 
remains actively engaged. This left the question whether a U.S. citizen or a legally resident 
alien, who was not captured on a traditional battlefield and had not even taken up arms 
against the United States on behalf of an enemy nation, could likewise be detained as an 
enemy combatant. 
 The Combatant-Civilian Distinction, supra, at 1153. Walen’s argument was that such a 
determination, made far from the battlefield and in a context where civilian law enforcement was 
operating effectively and could capably dispose of the issue, “threatens to strip the protections of the 
criminal law and its highly protective due process framework from people who any civil libertarian 
would think deserve to benefit from them.” Id. at 1158. In a similar vein, other scholars asserted 
that generational detention without charge, under any justification, is inconsistent with American 
constitutional jurisprudence and international human rights law. As early as 2002, one Canadian 
scholar considered the implications to American constitutional law: 
The Pentagon’s top lawyer has gone further, to suggest that even terror suspects who are 
tried and acquitted may be held in indefinite detention. A senior aide to former president 
George Bush Sr. is worried: “Would I be comfortable keeping them in Guantanamo for 20 
years on the theory that the war on terrorism is still going on? Probably not.” I would 
remove the “probably”. No principle of international or American law can be invoked to 
permit indefinite preventive detention. 
 Stephen J. Toope, Fallout from ‘9-11’: Will a Secure Culture Undermine Human Rights?, 65 SASK. L. 
REV. 281, 289 (2002). In the ten years that have passed since 9/11, America and the world continue 
to struggle with the legal effects of the GWOT and the effect of detaining persons in an armed 
conflict that transcends borders and traditional battlefields. While criticism began at the same time 
the original detention plan was implemented, today concerns seem to stem from the duality of 
looking back a decade and looking into the future indefinitely. Critics of long-term detention also 
focus on the relative inefficiency of trials by military commission—a handful charged and even fewer 
convicted and sentenced—despite the immense public support. A common theme in modern 
criticism is that the “law of war detention is not an alternative to prosecution—the central focus of 
both POW detention and civilian detention for security reasons under the Fourth Geneva 
Convention is not criminal prosecution but protective and preventive detention.” Laurie R. Blank, A 
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there is substantial dispute on the international legal basis for such detentions, one thing is 
certain: no humanitarian law treaty provides express authority to detain captives based on 
this categorization. This has led many critics of U.S. detention practices to condemn the legal 
rationale for preventive detentions. 
For purposes of U.S. practice, it is clear that the authority to detain unprivileged enemy 
belligerents has been legally sanctioned by both the Supreme Court and Congress (originally 
by implication and now expressly pursuant to the NDAA 2012) as an exercise of national war 
powers.213 It is equally clear, however, that this legal basis is most robust in relation to 
individuals designated as unprivileged belligerents as the result of their participation in 
combat operations against U.S. or coalition military forces.214 The definition of unprivileged 
belligerent (originally unlawful enemy combatant) has, however, never been restricted to 
such individuals. Instead, from the inception of the war on terror it has included individuals 
who associate with al-Qaeda or who provide support (qualified at various times as material or 
substantial) to belligerent forces or to international terrorist groups. This expansive definition 
of a detainable captive has undoubtedly contributed to the overall criticism leveled at the 
United States. 
Providing captives with assistance of counsel during their detention hearings will 
obviously not impact the scope of asserted detention authority. However, assuming counsel 
will enhance the quality of representation—an assumption at the core of this Article—it will 
mitigate the over-breadth inherent in the current definition of unprivileged belligerents 
subject to preventive detention. Perhaps more importantly, this mitigating effect will likely 
bear an inverse relationship to the perceived legitimacy of the different categories of 
                                                                                                                               
Square Peg in a Round Hole: Stretching Law of War Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS L. REV. 1169, 
1189 (2011). Taken a step further, the argument against indefinite detention is becoming and will 
remain that “suggest[ing] that the United States can either prosecute detainees or hold them in 
indefinite detention is equivalent to suggesting that detention is another form of punishment.” Id. 
On another level, even the federal courts most sympathetic to the government’s national security 
concerns are critical of the potential indefinite detention scheme. Considering generational 
detention at facilities in Afghanistan and detainees’ inability to challenge such detention using 
habeas, Judge John Bates wrote: 
It is one thing to detain those captured on the surrounding battlefield at a place like 
Bagram, which respondents correctly maintain is in a theater of war. It is quite another 
thing to apprehend people in foreign countries—far from any Afghan battlefield—and then 
bring them to a theater of war, where the Constitution arguably may not reach. Such 
rendition resurrects the same specter of limitless Executive power the Supreme Court 
sought to guard against in Boumediene—the concern that the Executive could move 
detainees physically beyond the reach of the Constitution and detain them indefinitely. 
 Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 220 (2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 213. See, e.g., Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub.L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (authorizing 
the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks . . . in order to 
prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons”). By implication, “all necessary force” includes the detaining persons 
believed to be planning or aiding in past or future terror attacks against the United States. 
 214. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004). In her plurality opinion, Justice O’Connor recognized 
that both Hamdi and the Government “agree that initial captures on the battlefield need not receive 
the process we have discussed here [i.e., the right to challenge detention]; that process is due only 
when the determination is made to continue to hold those who have been seized.” Id. 
 Unprivileged Belligerents, Preventive Detention, and Fundamental Fairness 
163 
detainable unprivileged belligerents. Individuals captured on what is best described as a 
traditional field of battle after having engaged in hostilities against U.S. or coalition forces—
the type of individual most analogous to a traditional enemy prisoner of war and therefore 
most justifiably subjected to wartime preventive detention215—would be unlikely to garner 
much benefit from assistance of counsel. In contrast, captives alleged to be subject to 
preventive detention as the result of a tenuous association with al-Qaeda or for providing 
support to belligerent forces or terrorist operations—the aspect of the unprivileged belligerent 
definition most attenuated from the traditional enemy prisoner of war definition and 
therefore most susceptible to criticism—would garner the most benefit from assistance of 
counsel. The weight of evidence, credibility of witnesses and statements, and inferences 
derived from circumstantial evidence is most critical in relation to these captives, all aspects 
of the detention review process that implicate the core competency of effective legal 
representation.216 
The third potential benefit that would likely flow from provision of counsel to captives 
facing preventive detention would be a more efficient culling of justified versus unjustified 
detentions. Because this will serve the interests of captives and the military, this benefit may 
in fact be the most significant. It is utterly false to assume that the military benefits from an 
overly broad swath of detention authority. On the contrary, detaining individuals without 
legitimate justification consumes limited resources unnecessarily, detracts from the allocation 
of effort focused on individuals legitimately subject to detention, alienates local populations, 
and undermines the overall credibility of the detention operation. However, it is difficult to 
ignore the reality that soldiers at the point of capture have an incentive to err on the side of 
caution and initially detain individuals even when the justification is uncertain. At this point 
in the detention process, soldiers lack the clarity of careful evidentiary assessments and lack 
the time and space to consider the totality of the circumstances related to their decision. As a 
result, the military itself has a strong interest in an efficient yet effective process to cull from 
the group of captive individuals subject to long-term preventive detention whose initial 
detention is determined to have been unjustified (a consideration obviously recognized by 
Congress when it exempted point-of-capture detention decisions from the legal representation 
provision of the NDAA). 
                                                                                                                               
 215. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 (1942) (“Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention 
as prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to capture 
and detention, but, in addition, they are subject to trial and punishment by military tribunals for 
acts which render their belligerency unlawful.”); Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518, 521 (holding that 
detention of “individuals falling into the limited category [defined by the AUMF], for the duration of 
the particular conflict in which they were captured, is so fundamental and accepted an incident to 
war as to be an exercise of the ‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the 
President to use” and that “the United States may detain, for the duration of these hostilities, 
individuals legitimately determined to be Taliban combatants.”). So long as American forces are 
engaged in combat in Afghanistan, the Court held that if the United States proves that the person 
was “ ‘engaged in an armed conflict against the United States’ . . . [the] detentions [would be] part of 
the exercise of ‘necessary and appropriate force’ . . . authorized by the AUMF.” Id. 
 216. This consideration may justify a limited provision of counsel, triggered only when a captive is 
subjected to detention for conduct that did not occur in the context of combat operations. 
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Enhancing the quality of the fact-finding and review process would contribute to a more 
efficient allocation of detention resources and mitigate the very real risk of unjustified 
detentions. Assuming provision of counsel for detainees would provide such an enhancement, 
the benefit of a more effective continued detention determination would clearly be within the 
interest of U.S. forces. The more complex the status determination, the more significant this 
benefit becomes. This provides a rational basis to distinguish between true GPW Article 5 
tribunal processes and detention review proceedings related to unprivileged belligerents. As 
discussed above, identifying those captives who should be detained by virtue of their status as 
unprivileged belligerents in the context of the war on terror is far more complex than 
analogous determinations in the context of an armed conflict against a traditional state-
armed force. This provides a logical explanation for why providing assistance of counsel for 
unprivileged belligerents does not necessitate an analogous extension of this protection to 
suspected POWs brought before an Article 5 tribunal. 
All of these potential benefits are of course only one aspect of the decision-making 
equation. Any extension of legal representation for wartime detention determination must 
account for the costs of such provision. These costs fall into three broad categories. First, the 
resource allocation cost, or more specifically, the burden imposed on the military legal 
community to allocate the manpower to satisfy this requirement. Second, the transaction cost 
produced by injecting legal representation for detainees at status determination 
proceedings—the adversarial instincts of lawyers will almost inevitably influence the nature 
of these proceedings, making them potentially more cumbersome and complex. Finally, the 
precedential cost of providing counsel as a matter of policy absent a clear legal obligation to 
do so. No matter how vigorously the government emphasizes the gratuitous nature of such a 
policy (which should be a central aspect of implementing the NDAA mandate), future 
detention operations would almost certainly be impacted by a perceived need to replicate the 
policy, even in situations without analogous justification. It is to these costs that this Article 
now turns. 
VI.  But Is It Feasible? 
Congress obviously concluded that none of these concerns justified the continuation of the 
pure lay representative model. However, this does not render them irrelevant. Instead, they 
will almost certainly influence the definition of the long-term trigger, and should be at least 
considered in order to place this development into wider strategic and operational context. 
A. Added Complexity 
Making a review process more complex as a result of more effective representation may be 
inevitable. However, this cost will be offset by the benefit of this complexity: improved 
accuracy. Accuracy is certainly the ultimate objective of any detention review process, for it 
not only protects the individual captive from unjustified deprivation of liberty, but also 
protects the detaining power from releasing captives who should be subjected to continued 
detention. Compromising accuracy in the interest of efficiency is simply not defensible, 
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especially when the consequence of erroneous decisions is as profound as that associated with 
the wartime preventive detention process. 
B. Precedential Impact? 
The risk that providing legal representation to individuals subjected to wartime 
preventive detention will be leveraged in future conflicts to press for extending this protection 
to more traditional enemy captives is a much more significant concern. Since the end of World 
War II, there has been a steady and increasing pressure to extend human rights principles to 
the context of armed conflict.217 During this same period, it has also become commonplace for 
U.S. (and other) armed forces to supplement with policy the range of individual protections 
required by law during military operations. The combination of these two factors—the ever 
increasing emphasis on protecting individual human rights during military operations and 
the practice of implementing protections often not required by law—has increasingly blurred 
the line between law and policy. 
Military practitioners are cognizant of this risk, and as a result it is almost inevitable that 
it will influence assessments of the wisdom of adopting gratuitous human rights protections 
during armed conflict. However, this risk does not sufficiently offset the potential benefits of 
providing legal representation as a matter of policy. Instead, it necessitates a clear and 
constant emphasis that it is indeed policy, and not a sense of legal obligation, motivating this 
modification to the existing practice. 
Unfortunately, Congress does not seem to have been cognizant of the importance of this 
emphasis. The NDAA 2012 legal representation provision in no way indicates whether it was 
adopted as a matter of national policy or in order to satisfy a perceived international legal 
obligation. Indeed, the precedential impact of this provision of the NDAA 2012 is almost 
                                                                                                                               
 217. See Geoffrey Corn, Mixing Apples and Hand Grenades: The Logical Limit of Applying Human 
Rights Norms to Armed Conflict, 1 J. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. STUD. 52, 57, 59–61 (2010) (attributing 
this pressure, in part, to the decrease in long-term military operations in the increase of so-called 
“peace operations”). The article refers specifically to 
military operations that did not involve sustained armed hostilities and therefore were 
almost universally considered as failing outside the LOAC regulatory framework. One 
aspect of these operations was that while participating armed forces were always prepared 
to engage in combat like hostilities, use of force was normally restricted to response to actual 
or imminent threat. As a result, the operational legal focus tended more towards issues 
related to interacting with and treatment of the local civilian population than with the 
application of combat power in a manner analogous to such application during armed 
conflict. 
 Id. at 59 (footnotes omitted). Other law of war scholars have observed that 
From an empirical perspective . . . there has been a convergence between the international 
humanitarian law detention review standards and processes that one would find in 
international armed conflict, and the human rights-oriented detention review standards and 
processes that one would find in domestic or even international criminal law proceedings. 
This convergence has been incremental, and responsive in large part to international politics 
and litigation in U.S. courts. This convergence is more than a question of politics and 
judicial decisions on the reach of executive power—treaty and customary international law 
provide little detail as to what the standards and processes for detention review are, and 
therefore allow states a significant degree of latitude in fashioning their own measures. 
 Prescott, supra note 31, at 17 (footnotes omitted). 
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certainly more uncertain because it took the form of a statute and not a Department of 
Defense policy. Because of this, any implementing regulations should emphasize the 
gratuitous nature of this provision, and that it does not indicate that the United States 
considers legal representation an international legal requirement. 
C. Resource Drain? 
Another significant consideration related to providing legal representation during the 
preventive detention process is personnel impact on the military legal community. Military 
lawyers, or JAGs, are a finite resource in any operational context. Furthermore, the emphasis 
on rule of law and legally compliant operations has imposed a greater demand on these 
lawyers today than ever before, a burden that will almost certainly become even more 
demanding in the future. As a result, imposing an additional requirement on this finite pool 
of lawyers should not be done casually. 
Because detainee representation duties are not currently assigned to JAGs, it is 
impossible to dispute the fact that this change in policy will impose a significant new 
responsibility on these military lawyers. However, this responsibility will provide a valuable 
opportunity for these lawyers to engage in a function that hones core advocacy and 
operational competencies. It may also be logical to leverage the already existing military trial 
defense services to assume this duty, perhaps with augmentation from reserve components 
activated on a rotational basis to represent detainees. Like all missions in the military, once it 
is prioritized there is simply no question that it will be effectively accomplished. 
VII. Conclusion 
Indefinite preventive detention is an inevitable necessity of armed hostilities. Some see 
this as unfortunate, others as mission essential, and still others as wholly illegitimate. These 
reactions, while understandable, simply do not diminish the reality that preventive detention 
will be a continued aspect of the U.S. struggle against international terrorism. Like all wars 
before and those to come in the future, preventing captured belligerent operatives from 
returning to the fight is logical and necessary to achieve tactical, operational, and strategic 
success. 
There is, however, another aspect of this preventive detention process that is equally 
undeniable: the unconventional nature of the struggle against terrorism and the operatives 
that form the ranks of this enemy. This reality creates a risk of erroneous detention and 
unjustified long-term deprivation of liberty that is exponentially more significant than the 
risk associated with conventional or “traditional” armed conflicts. This endangers not only the 
liberty interest of innocent individuals erroneously suspected of being agents of terrorists 
groups, but also the strategic interests of the United States by eroding the precious 
perception of legitimacy. 
Providing legal representation to individuals brought before administrative detention 
review proceedings is an important aspect of mitigating this risk. No process can guarantee 
complete accuracy in the outcomes of each of these proceedings; however, providing extensive 
process without representatives devoted to the ethos of zealous representation seems 
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remarkably hollow. As American law students learn through the Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, it is the zealous devotion to the client that effectuates 
the process erected to protect individuals from government accusation. 
The recent inclusion of a military legal representation provision in the NDAA 2012 is an 
important development in this area. While it is unclear why Congress included this provision, 
it nonetheless reflects a judgment that the current lay-representation approach derived from 
the Prisoner of War Convention Article 5 Tribunal process is insufficient to address the 
interests of war-on-terror detainees. How this provision will be implemented is yet to be seen, 
but perhaps the Department of Defense should embrace the logic of entrusting lawyers with 
this responsibility early in the detention review process. While the gratuitous nature of this 
protection should absolutely be emphasized, the potential benefits that will flow from this 
change sufficiently outweigh the costs and warrant abandoning the current approach. 
  
